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The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act mandate the establish-
ment of nonprofit associations of practicing physicians, called Professional
Standard Review Organizations (PSROs), as part of the machinery imple-
menting Social Security Act medical service programs.' Under these amend-
ments, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) must
enter into agreements assigning certain administrative functions in imple-
menting the Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health programs
to PSROs. 2 The statute directs PSROs to develop and apply "suitable pro-
cedures" to ensure "that the services for which payment may be made under
this chapter [the Social Security Act] will conform to appropriate professional
standards for the provision of health care .... 3
Initially, PSROs will review services provided on an in-patient basis at
acute care hospitals, for which payment is to be made under the Social Se-
curity Act, to determine if these services (1) are medically necessary, (2)
meet professionally recognized standards of quality, and (3) are provided in
the most appropriate and economical setting.4 In exercising their review re-
sponsibility, PSROs are to establish "norms of care, diagnosis, and treat-
ment" to be used as "principal points of evaluation and review." 5 They are
also expected to develop and review "profiles" of patient care data and to
decide whether medical services provided by doctors or institutions meet the
* Member of the District of Columbia and California Bars. A.B., Barnard Col-
lege, 1960; LL.B., University of California at Los Angeles, 1964.
** Research Associate, Harvard University School of Public Health. B.A., Univer-
sity of Rochester, 1965; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 1972.
In preparing this article, the authors visited pilot PSRO projects to determine what
workable procedures might be developed for PSROs. A contract from the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare partially supported their work. The views expressed
are those of the authors.
1. Social Security Amendments of 1972 §§ 1151-1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-
19 (Supp. III, 1973). Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citation to sections re-
fers to the Social Security Amendments of 1972.
2. Id. § 1152(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1(a).
3. Id. § 11,51, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c.
4. Id. § 1155(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(1).
5. Id. § 1156(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a).
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applicable standards of medical necessity, quality, and economy of setting to
qualify for reimbursement. 6
The targets of PSRO actions are the treating doctor and the institutional
provider (often a hospital which orders or provides the health care services),
but the sanction-nonavailability of Medicare, Medicaid, or Maternal and
Child Health program funds to pay for the cost of services-has a most seri-
ous impact on the patient.7 Thus the procedures adopted by PSROs in
carrying out their adminstrative functions are of great importance to each of
these parties. 8 While the statute recognizes the separate "interests" of the
patient, doctor, and hospital in a PSRO determination, it provides sketchy
procedural guidance for PSROs.9 Patients, doctors, and hospitals are each
6. Id. § 1155(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(4).
7. Doctors and hospitals are themselves obliged to assure that services provided
under the Social Security Act meet standards of medical necessity, quality, appropriate-
ness, and economy of setting. See id. § 1160(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(a). PSROs have
other related functions-conducting studies, collecting and evaluating data, and edu-
cating.
PSROs are directed to use existing hospitals or other health care facility or organiza-
tion review mechanisms, such as utilization review committees, see note 20 infra, subject
to a PSRO decision that these bodies meet PSRO standards. Id. § 1155(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c-4(e). Institutional review committees must also meet all statutory and HEW
imposed guidelines applicable to PSROs in performing these functions.
8. See pp. 418-22 infra.
9. Section 1159a, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8(a) (Supp. III, 1973) provides:
Any beneficiary or recipient who is entitled to benefits under this chapter
(other than subchapter V) or a provider or practitioner who is dissatisfied with
a determination with respect to a claim made by a Professional Standards Re-
view Organization in carrying out its responsibilities for the review of profes-
sional activities in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1320c-
4(a) of this title shall, after being notified of such determination, be entitled
to a consideration thereof by the Professional Standards Review Organization
This provision applies to determinations under section 1155(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-4(a)(1) (Supp. In, 1973), which requires that the services (1) be medically nec-
essary, (2) meet professionally recognized standards of quality, and (3) be supplied in
the most economical setting. It also applies to determinations made in advance under
section 1155(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(2) (Supp. III, 1973), which requires that
elective admissions to hospitals or other health care facilities and health care services
consisting of extended or costly courses of treatment be medically necessary and supplied
in the most economical setting. For the present, these review responsibilities are limited
to services provided by or in institutions unless the PSRO has made a request to the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) that it be able to review other
health care services and the Secretary has approved such request. Id. § 1155(g), 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-4(g).
Throughout the Act a patient is referred to as a "beneficiary" or "recipient" entitled
to benefits under the Act; a doctor is a "practitioner," and a hospital, inter alia, is a
"provider." It should be noted that the provider may have a dual role. Its utilization
review committee may be delegated the PSRO's review functions; at the same time it
has party status before this review committee.
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entitled to be "notified" of a PSRO determination and to a "reconsideration
thereof" by the PSRO. 10 Additionally, practitioners and providers are en-
titled to "notice" and an "appropriate opportunity for discussion and review"
immediately after a proposal for providing a health care service has been
denied."
Because HEW has set as the PSRO's first task the review of in-patient
services provided to Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health
patients,' 2 this article will explore procedures for making such determina-
tions, and for providing notice and reconsideration which are required as part
of PSRO in-patient service review.'1
I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PSROs
A. Statutory Background
The congressional mandate for the PSRO program of "peer review"-re-
view by practicing physicians of the appropriateness and quality of medical
services provided by other practicing physicians-was the product of high ex-
pectations but very modest prior experience.14  The provisions were intro-
10. The statutory language is murky, and it is not clear whether a notification of fa-
vorable as well as adverse PSRO decisions must be made. A possible construction, adopted
by HEW, is that notification is only required with respect to an adverse decision because
the statute speaks in terms of the rights of dissatisfied patients, doctors or providers. See
pp. 426-29 infra.
11. See § 1161, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-10 (Supp. III, 1973). The Act provides for re-
view of PSRO reconsiderations, permitting an appeal to a statewide PSRO Council when
the matter in controversy is $100 or more. A hearing before the Secretary of HEW
under § 205(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970), may then be
sought by the beneficiary or recipient (but not by a provider or practitioner). The de-
cision of the Secretary is subject to judicial review as prescribed in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1970), only if the matter involves $1,000 or more. See § 1159, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-
8 (Supp. I1, 1973).
12. HEW guidelines for PSROs are published in U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and
Welfare, P.S.R.O. Program Manual (March 15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as P.S.R.O.
Manual]. The Manual has not yet been published in the Federal Register. Thus the
extent to which its directives are binding is open to question. Cf. Thorpe v. Housing
Author., 393 U.S. 268, 274-76 (1969).
13. Because they may ultimately prove to be the most important of the PSRO admin-
istrative actions, procedures related to reviews directed at individual doctors, hospitals,
or other providers, and determinations with respect to the use of institutional review
committees, require a comprehensive discussion beyond the bounds of this article.
14. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 258 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as SENATE REPORT]; Proceedings of the American Medical Association's House of Dele-
gates, quoted in American Society of Internal Medicine, PSRO-A Guide to Its Imple-
mentation Through Peer Review (1973). Medicine self-policing is not a novel concept.
Nearly every hospital has a tissue committee checking reports on supposedly diseased
organs to make sure their removal was necessary. Utilization review is now required
for hospital accreditation. Medical records committees and death committees are com-
mon.
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duced as part of the Social Security Act Amendments by Senator Charles
Bennett of ,Utah, ranking minority member of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee.1 PSROs are modeled after a few pilot programs established by doctors
organized as "medical foundations.""' Programs such as those in Sacra-
mento, California (CHAP), New Mexico (HAPP), and Illinois (HASP)
were performing out-patient claims and hospital utilization review using peer
review mechanisms.'" However, the claims and utilization review of these
programs had a limited scope, usually applying fairly simple standards.' 8 In
most cases, reviews were based on published norms for typical lengths of
stay (specified by diagnosis, age, sex, with or without surgery, and with mul-
tiple diagnoses). 19
Although Medicare had required hospitals to perform their own utiliza-
tion review, 20 the results were not impressive. 21  Congress, hoping that an-
Practice by physicians organized into groups known as "medical foundations" is in-
creasing, and peer review is an important function. See id. at 1-2. See also B. DECKER
& P. BONNER, PSRO: ORGANIZATION FOR REGIONAL PEER REVIEW 14 (1973). For a
critique of peer review, see L. Keelty, M. Lam, R. Phillits, J. Quirin & R. McCleery,
One Life-One Physician; An Inquiry Into the Medical Profession's Performance in
Self-Regulation (Center for the Study of Responsive Law, 1970).
15. The PSRO proposals were first introduced as an amendment to the pending Social
Security Bill in 1970. 116 CONG. REC. 29605 (1970). No final action was taken
on the bill and it was reintroduced as Amendment 823 to the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1972 on January 25, 1972. 118 CONG. REC. 1017 (1972).
16. See SENATE REPORT 257-58. These foundation programs, along with similar pilot
efforts in San Joaquin, California, and the states of Georgia and Colorado, were dis-
cussed in the Senate hearings in 1972. See Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1049-50 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Bennett); Testimony of F. William Dowda, Secretary, American Ass'n of Foundations
for Medical Care, id., pt. 3, at 2512-1.5.
17. Among the pilot PSRO projects were several funded by HEW under the name
of Experimental Medical Care Review Organizations (EMCROs). For an evaluative
study of the EMCROs, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EMCRO
PROGRAMS, (HEW Publication No. (HSM) 73-3017, 1973) [hereinafter cited as EMCRO
PROGRAMS]. (This study was conducted by B. Decker and P. Bonner, for HEW. See
note 14 supra).
18. See id. at 153-67, 176-77. See also Flashner, Reed, Coburn, & Fine, Professional
Standards Review Organizations-Analysis of Their Development and Implementation
Based on a Preliminary Review of the Hospital Admission and Surveillance Program in
Illinois, 223 J.A.M.A. 1473 (1973), and the critique of this enthusiastic appraisal in an
unpublished letter from David M. Kinzer, Executive Vice-President, Illinois Hospital
Ass'n, to the Editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association (May 29,
1973). This observation was strengthened by the authors' visits to some of the projects.
19. See B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 14, at 39.
20. These requirements, implementing the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k)
(Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1970), are the subject of HEW reg-
ulations recently amended. 39 Fed. Reg. 41604-18, amending 20 C.F.R. § 405.801-.872
(1974). HEW's regulations contemplate that utilization review requirements are su-
perceded by PSRO procedures as the PSROs become operational. There are no specified
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other approach might do better, therefore assigned responsibility to local
practicing physicians. 22 A very ambitious program was enacted providing for
comprehensive PSRO review of the services provided each patient, as well
as PSRO monitoring of the patterns of practice of doctors both inside and
outside institutional settings. The object of these reviews is described by the
legislation in sweeping terms; as noted above, PSROs are to decide if services
are "medically necessary" and provided in accordance with "professionally
recognized standards. '23 What is medically necessary and professionally ac-
ceptable will be defined by the PSRO programs themselves in their develop-
ment of norms. However, evaluators of pilot review projects, now helping
to prepare PSROs for their job, concede that there is an enormous gap be-
tween the task set for PSROs under the statute and the level of experience
procedural safeguards for the decisionmaking of utilization review committees. How-
ever, when they act as delegates of PSROs, they must meet standards required for
PSROs.
HEW's utilization review regulations are under challenge in American Medical Ass'n
v. Weinberger, No. 75-C-56 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 20, 1975). The AMA contends (1)
that the utilization review programs violate the constitutional right of physicians to prac-
tice medicine and the constitutional right of patients to receive medical care in accord-
ance with their doctor's best judgment, and (2) that institution of the program without
specific statutory authorization exceeds the Secretary's authority, contravening sections
of the Social Security Act. Just prior to the printing of this article, Judge Julius J. Hoff-
man granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting HEW from implementing the new reg-
ulations which were to become effective July 1, 1975. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1975,
at 24, col. 1 (city ed.). The court enumerated many grounds upon which it believed
the AMA was likely to prevail. These included serious doubts that the format for uti-
lization review is workable, with particular doubt that admission review within one day
of such admission will force a decision by the reviewing physicians even before they can
receive the results of "tests required to judge the correctness of the decision to admit."
Id. at col. 3.
Another recent challenge to the PSRO law, raising similar questions of the constitu-
tional rights of doctors and patients, was defeated; a three judge district court ruled that
the PSRO law in which Congress explicitly established a medical utilization review pro-
gram meets all constitutional standards. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v.
Weinberger, No. 73-C-1653 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1975). See note 35 infra.
21. See SENATE REPORT 255-56. Generally these efforts were successful only where
there was a shortage of hospital beds. An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Utilization
Review Activities in Hospitals and Extended Care Facilities 10-12 (HEW study, pub-
lished by Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., Dec. 21, 1972).
22. A goal of the PSRO program, as of the utilization review program, is to curb
the rising costs of health care by eliminating unnecessary utilization. See SENATE RE-
PORT 260. This is viewed as improving the "quality" of medical care because "[u]n-
necessary hospitalization and unnecessary surgery are not consistent with proper health
care." Id. at 254. However, it is also possible that a PSRO could find underutilization
of health services and facilities. See Brook, A Skeptic Looks at Peer Review, PRIsM,
October, 1974, at 29. Passage of the PSRO amendments increased HEWs power to im-
pose sanctions for overutilization and for provision of unnecessary services. See Mount
Sinai Hosp. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099, 1135 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
23. See note 9 supra.
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of the prior programs. They explain that "the scope of the review program
envisioned is literally enormous, clearly straining, if not exceeding, the state
of the art and the resources of most areas."' 24 Moreover, they point out that
the money needed in order for PSROs to do a good job may not be avail-
able.
25
This lack of needed expertise and finances, coupled with a wide-ranging
mandate for action and strong pressure for results, provides a shaky founda-
tion for the development of fair and workable procedures for some 203 new
administrative bodies. 26 The pilot review projects used simple administra-
tive procedures. Controversies were handled at conferences between the at-
tending doctor and the physician reviewer. In a few cases a more senior
doctor or medical committee was brought in, but the patient was not in-
volved.2 7 PSROs cannot expect that such measures will suffice.
24. B. DECKER & P. BONNER, CRITERIA IN PEER REVIEW 8 (HEW study, published by
Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1974). In the House of Representatives, it had
been proposed that HEW further develop experiments and demonstrations of peer review
systems. See H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972). HEW Secretary Rich-
ardson supported peer review efforts, but stressed the need for further development. See
Hearings on H.R. 1, supra note 16, at 45. The Senate Finance Committee apparently
experienced no such qualms. It concluded, "Experience by these organizations [the pilot
foundation programs] has provided the committee with convincing evidence that peer
review can-and should-be implemented on an operational, rather than merely an ex-
perimental basis." SENATE REPORT 258.
25. B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 24, at 8.
26. HEW has designated 203 PSRO areas. See 42 C.F.R. § 101 (1974).
27. Major PSRO prototype programs report as follows:
Number of Cases "Appealed"
Beyond a Discussion With
Programs the Physician Advisor
Program One:
One of two major PSRO Two cases since program
prototypes: began began.
implementation of hospital
admissions review on pilot
basis circa 1971.
Program Two:
One of two major PSRO Currently one or two
prototypes: began cases monthly, out of
implementation of hospital approximately 4,000
admissions review on pilot hospital admissions
basis circa 1970. monitored monthly.
Program Three:
38 months of program One case since program
operation, began.
Program Four:
Information unavailable. "Less than 1% ;"
refused to supply clarifying
data.
Program Five:
18 months of program operation; None.
approximately 2500 reviews.
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The PSRO program contemplates the application of diverse and relatively
untried criteria. 28  More comprehensive procedural safeguards must be im-
plemented in order to protect affected patients, as well as doctors and hospi-
tals. 29  Naturally, the more complicated the administrative procedures and
safeguards, the greater the cost of the program. The best response to a con-
cern that such procedures are too expensive and, therefore, defeat the cost-
saving purposes of the program, is for PSROs to proceed cautiously, begin-
ning with the application of simple criteria in limited circumstances and pro-
During a recent month, one of the major prototypes reported for one typical hospital
a total of 2,836 discharges:
755 of these discharges were cases in which length of stay extensions were
granted, 75% were granted by a nonphysician review coordinator without
seeking the physician advisor's approval;
355 cases were reviewed by a doctor;
204 of the 355 cases were cases in which the advisor approved a length of
stay extension; and
151 cases involved disapprovals of the attending physician's proposal.
The other chief prototype explained that out of approximately 3,900 hospital admis-
sions monitored monthly, there are 50 cases in which the attending physician's proposal
is not approved (over 80% of these concern length of stay).
For comparison, a recently implemented program offered the following data:
5,691 admissions monitored in one month;
3,131 length of stay extensions granted;
1,702 cases reviewed by physician advisor-55 involved denials and approx-
imately two cases were appealed.
Series of telephone interviews with the pilot projects, October, 1974. For a detailed ac-
count of one of the major PSRO prototypes, see Nelson, Relation Between Quality As-
sessment and Utilization Review in a Functioning PSRO, 292 NEw ENG. J. of MED. 671
(1975) (out of 34,000 cases screened by the program, approval of the proposed stay or
treatment was withdrawn in 47 cases).
28. Moreover, PSROs are expected to "take full advantage of rapidly evolving com-
puter technology." SENATE REPORT 257. The congressional expectation was that the
development of standards as well as the screening processes applying these norms could
be automated, thus conserving "physician review time." SENATE REPORT 264-65. For
a discussion of the "sweeping trend" toward a heavy reliance on statistically derived in-
dices of care, see Coulter, Peer Review Tutor oj Judge, 230 J.A.M.A. 1161-63 (1974).
See also Your Peer, The Computer, Ma. EcoN., May 14, 1973, at 15.
29. The P.S.R.O. Manual explains that the review system is to be "comprehensive
• . . simultaneously pursu[ing] the assessment and assurance of quality across a spec-
trum of disease entities, service and service delivery problems while also operating as
an ongoing mechanism to assure appropriate utilization of services." P.S.R.O. Manual
ch. VII, § 701, at 3. Some PSROs appear to be planning to use complicated and broad
ranging criteria-standards which are newly developed, and need to be proved and re-
fined. See B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 24, at 104-06, 138. Decker and Bonner
set out criteria developed by the EMCROs. A quick look suggests the magnitude of the
problem facing PSROs which attempt to develop procedures of review to ensure fair and
correct decisionmaking. There are 50 general operations (surgical procedures), 232
general diagnoses, and 217 specific diagnoses (many with subsets) for which one or
more of the EMCROs have developed criteria.
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gressing step by step, rather than in leaps and bounds.30  Such caution seems
appropriate on both medical and legal grounds.
B. Legal Framework for PSRO Procedures
'PSROs are designated and funded by the government to carry out gov-
ernmental tasks assigned to them by statute. Their educational functions are
often stressed, and this emphasis may make the program more acceptable to
physicians. 3 ' But educational objectives cannot mask the fact that PSRO
tasks are adjudicatory and rulemaking in nature, encompassing such related
functions as investigating, supervising, prosecuting, advising and declaring.
Such activities are hallmarks of the administrative process. When govern-
mental bodies exercise powers of adjudication or rulemaking by virtue of
statutory authorization, they are to that extent an administrative agency.3
2
PSROs are private organizations performing self-regulatory functions with re-
spect to doctors and providers of medical care, but they are performing these
functions for the Secretary of HEW under a congressional delegation of au-
thority. Thus, PSRO determinations are an integral part of the govern-
mental administrative process, and PSROs must conform to the basic prin-
ciples which govern administrative agency procedures. 33
30. The EMCRO evaluators agree:
We believe that the complete requirements of P.L. 92-603 exceed the capa-
bilities of the current state-of-the-art of medical care appraisal and the re-
sources of most areas. While planning for full functional implementation,
most PSRO's will have to carefully select specific programs for early implemen-
tation. Care will be required to relate these choices to the needs and resources
of each designated area.
B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 14, at 30.
31. EMCRO PROGRAMS, supra note 17, at 174. The authors explain that "med-
ical care appraisal, by peer review techniques, requires the willing participation of physi-
cians" and observe that the major control over EMCROs by organized medicine resulted
in "a major emphasis on nonpunitive educational outputs." Id. See Claude E. Welch,
M.D., 289 NEw ENG. J. of MED. 291 (1973) (Dr. Welch is the Chairman of the Amer-
ican Medical Association's Task Force on Guidelines of Care); Coulter, supra note 28.
To the extent that doctors are required to change their patterns of practice by the PSRO
-whether by "education" or "policing"-these PSRO activities fall within the well-worn
tracks of administrative determinations.
32. See K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.01 (1958).
33. There is the additional question of whether the "intimate involvement" of PSROs
with the secretarial implementation of the Social Security Act subjects the PSROs to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1970).
This difficult question-whether a PSRO is an agency under the APA-is further com-
plicated by the controversy over whether the Secretary of HEW is subject to the APA.
The latter question was raised in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), in which
the Court sidestepped the issue on the ground that "the social security administrative pro-
cedure does not vary from that prescribed by the APA." Id. at 409. Provisions in the
Social Security Act for formal hearing procedures would not govern PSROs since § 1159
[Vol. 24:407
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The most basic of these principles is that of procedural due process; in
many cases, persons who may be adversely affected by an agency determina-
tion must be given notice of the proposed action, a fair opportunity to know
the record on which the action is based, and an opportunity to be heard in
response. 34  These essentials of "fair procedure" must be furnished by pri-
vate agencies performing regulatory functions35 even in the absence of spe-
of the Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8 (Supp. I1, 1973), specifies other initial pro-
cedures for PSROs, i.e., notice and reconsideration, stating: "Any review or appeals pro-
vided under this section shall be in lieu of any review, hearing, or appeal under this
chapter with respect to the same issue." § 1159(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8(c) (Supp. I'I,
1973).
APA strictures are applicable to an "agency" which is defined as "each authority of
the Government of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970). Under the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, for example, Agriculture Stabilization and Conservation Service
Committees (ASCS Committees), local committees like PSROs whose members were
elected by producers and who made determinations under the Act, were not subject to
the APA although the Secretary of Agriculture's actions were. ASCS committees were
required to provide fair procedures. See Kephart v. Wilson, 219 F. Supp. 801 (W.D.
Tex. 1963).
34. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1 (1938).
35. In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Supreme Court
made it plain that the self-regulatory activity of stock exchanges cannot be carried out
in a "fundamentally unfair manner." id. at 364. Silver involved actions of the New
York Stock Exchange cancelling the private wire connections of a member who was al-
legedly in violation of the antitrust laws. The court explained that self-regulation by
exchanges was authorized by the Securities Exchange Act, but that the regulator must
provide for notice and a chance to be heard, even though the Securities Exchange Act
did not specifically mandate such procedures. Thus fair procedures were required as the
quid pro quo of antitrust immunity for self-regulatory actions. An important factor was
the regulatory agency's role as a part of the governmental machinery. Id. at 361-67.
See Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Cf. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Sec-
ondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655-57 & n.28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970).
Shortly before this article was published, the decision of Association of Am. Physi-
cians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, No. 73-C-1653 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1975), upheld the
constitutionality of the PSRO law. The three judge court held that various provisions
in the Act which require notice and a hearing before a physician can be barred from
participation in Medicare and Medicaid satisfied the doctor's rights to due process. It
ruled that private organizations, such as PSROs, can be delegated administrative func-
tions:
Finally, it has been held permissible for agencies of the Federal Government
to contract with private organizations in order to have such organizations per-
form governmental functions as long as the particular administrative scheme
provides for a hearing on the determinations made by those private organiza-
tions. See State of Texas v. National Bank of Commerce of San Antonio, 290
F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961), and Coral Gables Con-
valescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
Id. at 16-17 (Senate Committee on Finance reprint).
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cific congressional procedural mandates,80 so that decisions in federal gov-
ernment programs will be made fairly, not arbitrarily.
87
The court did not consider what standards were applicable to PSRO procedures. Thus
it is not clear from the decision whether the "particular administrative scheme" must
include a hearing during the PSRO reconsideration process as well as later at the secre-
tarial level. The National Bank of Commerce decision, cited by the court, was solely
addressed to the propriety of any delegation of governmental duties to outside agencies;
the Coral Gables decision only discussed review by the delegating governmental agency.
The Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons court also focused on secretarial and ju-
dicial review, saying:
These statutory provisions satisfy the demands of procedural due process by
apprising the practitioner or provider of any adverse determination and by af-
fording him an opportunity to be heard either by the Secretary or through the
avenue of judicial review. Such safeguards are consonant with the concept of
procedural due process as embodied in the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 9. No issue of PSRO procedures was raised.
36. Recently the courts have considered whether disciplinary action against doctors
by hospital or medical association boards, or refusal of staff appointments, met constitu-
tional due process standards. In a number of these cases, the courts have found that
some combination of substantial federal monies flowing to the hospital, tax exemptions,
pervasive state regulation, and franchises entailed, in return, obligations of observance
of federal constitutional mandates. See, e.g., Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Cen-
ter, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974); O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472
F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971);
Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Meredith v. Allen
County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Poe v. Charlotte Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313
F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Contra, Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 801-
02 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (summarizing cases in which state action was not found to be pres-
ent).
Due process requirements were imposed by the courts because the hospital and med-
ical boards acted as indirect instrumentalities of the government. PSROs are performing
regulatory functions as the direct instrumentality of the federal government and are
therefore plainly required to adhere to due process standards. Moreover, without regard
to state action, courts have indicated that a doctor's interest in pursuing his profession
may be a basis for imposing procedural requirements on a private professional organiza-
tion's disciplinary activities. See Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364
(7th Cir. 1972). Some PSRO action will adversely affect such physician interests. See
note 43 infra.
37. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270
U.S. 117 (1926).
An additional basis for imposing due process requirements on PSRO procedures is that
parties have a right to fair procedures early in the determination process in order to ef-
fectuate later rights. Otherwise the provision of elaborate due process rights at the sec-
retarial level or in judicial review is ineffective because it comes too late. Note, however,
that de novo review or appeal may cure administrative procedural deficiencies, if it oc-
curs before government action is final. See K. DAvis, ADMnISThATrvE LAW TREA-TnE
§ 7.10 (1958), which criticizes this principle.
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The obligation of PSROs to meet standards of procedural fairness is even
more apparent, since it rests additionally on specific statutory provisions.
The notification and reconsideration requirements of the PSRO statute pro-
vide that patients, doctors and providers must be informed of the record on
which the PSRO makes its decision and must be given an opportunity to re-
spond to that determinationA8 Having specifically mandated that procedural
safeguards be provided first at the PSRO level and extended finally to ju-
dicial review, the intention of Congress to provide at least the fundamentals
of fair procedure is evident. 9
The legal and constitutional bases of the PSRO's obligation to meet due
process requirements could be explored at great length, and the jurisprudence
concerning state action, the duties of private bodies performing governmental
functions, and the right of individuals to public benefits continues to grow. 40
As indicated in note 35 supra, the recent three judge court decision upholding the
PSRO statute focuses on secretarial and judicial review and does not discuss the implica-
tions of such requirements on procedures at the earlier PSRO level.
38. The language used in § 1159(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8(a) (Supp. III, 1973), com-
bining requirements of notice and reconsideration, is not a common statutory usage.
When interviewed, congressional personnel who participated in the drafting of the bill
recalled that the vagueness was deliberate in order to allow PSROs flexibility in devising
suitable procedures. While there was no intention to invariably require formal eviden-
tiary hearings, a person affected by the decision of the PSRO was to be allowed an op-
portunity to contest that decision in a manner suitable to the circumstances of the case.
There is little legislative history of the "notification" and "reconsideration" requirements,
but such as there is demonstrates this purpose. See SENATE REPORT 267-68. The provi-
sions for notice and discussion with doctors and providers appears to have an educative
purpose. See note 31 supra.
39. Such procedures have been held implicit in statutes with far less specific direc-
tives. See Juzek v. Hackensack Water Co., 48 N.J. 302, 225 A.2d 335 (1966), in which
the court stated: "A statute often speaks as plainly by inference as by express words
... . Where a statute which commands the exercise of a quasi-judicial function by an
administrative agency, contains no specific provision for notice and hearing, such re-
quirements may be implied." Id. at 315, 225 A.2d at 342. 'In Juzek, a statute which
provided for water council "approval" of the exercise of the right of condemnation "also
contemplate[d] all necessary requirements to satisfy due process . . . ." Id. See also
Paulsen v. City of Portland, 149 U.S. 30 (1893); Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177
F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1948). The narrow
reading that a party is entitled only to notice of an adverse decision and the right to
demand that the PSRO reconsider (on whatever basis it chooses), conforms to neither
the evident congressional purpose nor to due process requirements.
40. See, e.g., S. LAw, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG 135-44 (1974); Butler,
Medicare Appeals Procedures: A Constitutional Analysis, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 139
(1975); Carey, A Constitutional Right to Health Care: An Unlikely Development, 23
CATH. U.L. REv. 492 (1974); Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v. Kelly
Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L. REV.
549 (1974); O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing
Cases, 1970 S. CT. REV. 161 (1970).
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In recent decisions, beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 41 the courts have fo-
cused on these issues, with special emphasis on developing fair procedures in
public welfare programs. An extensive exploration of these issues is beyond
the scope of this article; rather, its focus will be to translate the concept of
fair procedures into practical terms. Deciding when and what sort of notice
is to be provided, what materials and records should be used in making deci-
sions, how these should be assembled, what the timing of the various steps
in the process should be, who should do the considering and reconsidering,
and what sort of hearing, if any, is required-these are some of the problems
which must be resolved as the PSRO charts its procedural course. To do
this, the PSRO must look at the possible consequences of a decision and the
circumstances in which it is to be made and then decide what constitutes fair
procedure.
42
C. The Effects of PSRO Determinations
The statute recognizes that the doctor ("practitioner"), the patient ("bene-
ficiary" or "recipient"), and the health care institution or organization ("pro-
vider") all have interests affected in diverse ways by PSRO determinations.
The unadorned legal effect of an adverse PSRO decision is that a federal
program will not pay for a particular treatment. A PSRO does not decide
in any individual case that a patient should be discharged from or not ad-
mitted to a hospital, or given or not given certain treatment. Each of these
decisions is made by the doctor, in some cases with the assent of the hospi-
tal.4' An adverse PSRO determination with respect to care already provided
could mean that the patient will be responsible for paying the bill; if the
patient is without sufficient means, the doctor and the hospital consequently
run the risk of not getting paid. An adverse PSRO determination with re-
spect to proposed care could mean that the patient does not receive care.
Thus while the PSRO acts upon decisions made by doctors and hospitals,
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
42. The Supreme Court has observed: "'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its
exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual
contexts." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
43. Although hospitals and doctors are unwilling to incur liability for denying needed
medical care, the PSRO's decision affords them some protection. See § 1167(c), 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (Supp. III, 1973). See also Comment, PSRO: Malpractice Lia-
bility and the Impact of the Civil Immunity Clause, 62 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1974). Hos-
pitals can be expected to assure that doctors who are subject to a degree of departmental
discipline (often, in the case of poor patients, residents on the hospital's staff) do not
place the hospital at substantial financial risk by repeatedly refusing or delaying the dis-
charge of patients. The case of Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir.
1973) is illustrative: there the health service provider stopped providing care when noti-
fied by Blue Cross, on behalf of HEW, that it would not be reimbursed.
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the immediate and primary impact of the PSRO determination is on the pa-
tient. There is a secondary financial impact on the doctor or provider if
treatment which the PSRO determines to be inappropriate is nevertheless
provided. There may be other significant impacts on the doctor or provider,
however, since the PSRO is obliged to report failures to provide necessary
and appropriate care to HEW, which may in turn impose sanctions. 44  Pro-
fessionally imposed sanctions may also result since the PSRO must enlist the
aid of medical societies or hospital disciplinary bodies in assuring that pro-
viders and practitioners meet these standards. 45 Even if formal sanctions are
not imposed, adverse PSRO decisions may affect a doctor's professional
standing.
D. The Setting In Which PSRO Decisions Will Be Made
Since the PSRO can decide that federal funds may not be used to pay for
certain services, the timing of its decision will have a crucial impact on all
affected parties. All sides wish to avoid retroactive denials for payment.
For this reason HEW has issued guidelines which require that every PSRO
plan which concerns review of in-patient, short-stay hospital care implement
(1) concurrent admission certification, and (2) continued stay review."
Under a concurrent admission certification, a determination is made of the
medical necessity and appropriateness of the admission either before or
shortly after a patient is admitted to a hospital. At the same time, an "initial
length of stay" is assigned.47 Continued stay review involves "assessment
of the medical necessity [for continued hospitalization]." It may also in-
clude "assessment of the quality of care being provided. ' 48  HEW directs
44. See §§ 1157, 1160, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(c)-6, 1320c-9(b), (c) (Supp. mI, 1973).
45. See id. § 1160(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(c).
46. See P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII. HEW is willing to consider alternative review
proposals in a limited number of cases, but it is expected that most PSROs will adopt
procedures consistent with the prescribed concurrent review format. id. § 705, at 5.
One alternative is precertification admission review by which length of stay review must
be done on a current basis, and some admissions cannot be screened in advance. This
works to the patient's advantage by permitting review before he enters the hospital, but
it does require more time and paperwork by the attending doctor than concurrent review.
HEW has been responsive to the doctors' problem in choosing concurrent review. For
recent agency comments on utilization review regulations, see 39 Fed. Reg. 41604
(1974).
Another alternative, retroactive review, is particularly abhorrent to doctors since it
increases their malpractice exposure. See Exhibit C filed by Ameican Medical Associ-
ation House of Delegates, Resolution 36, Hearings on H.R. 1, supra note 16, at 2682-83.
Patients may also be seriously harmed by retroactive review, see Harris v. Richardson,
357 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Va. 1973).
47. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 705.1, at 5-6.
48. Id. § 705.21, at 10.
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that the "initial screening review" occur within the first working day following
admission, or, in the case of elective surgery, before the surgery is per-
formed.4 9 Continued stay review must take place on or before the expiration
of the certified initial length of stay period.50 Because most PSRO decisions
are to be made while patients are in the hospital setting, expecting initial or
continuing treatment, there will be serious time and operational constraints
on decision and reconsideration procedures.
1. The Patient's Quandary.---Congress apparently recognized that ad-
verse PSRO determinations with respect to in-patient services for individuals
would have a more significant impact on the patient than the doctor or pro-
vider.5 1 A PSRO determination that proposed in-patient services are not re-
imbursable may require the patient, who is presumably ill, and, on the advice
of the doctor who admitted him is in need of hospitalization, to make new
plans for treatment or arrangements to leave the hospital. He must decide
which of two conflicting "expert" judgments (his doctor's or -the PSRO's) is
correct. Then, if he wishes to contest the decision, he must secure effec-
tive representation with respect to technical issues, all within a very short
time period. His doctor may help him reverse the PSRO decision,5 2 or his
doctor may have been persuaded by the PSRO to a position contrary to the
patient's. The PSRO staff may wish to help, but will usually do so only in
the context of effectuating its decision.
2. The Doctor's Dilemma.-The interests of a doctor and his patient are
not necessarily congruent. While doctors sometimes see themselves as the
patient's advocate and representative, they have their own individual inter-
ests and concerns at stake. There is, of course, a financial incentive. 3
49. Id. § 705.13, at 6.
50. Id. § 705.24, at 11.
51. Only the patient is given the right to appeal adverse PSRO determinations to the
Secretary of HEW and to subsequently seek judicial review. See § 1159, 42 U.S.C. §
1320c-8 (Supp. III, 1973).
52. As in any bureaucratic system, there will be doctors who know how to "deal"
with the system, and those who do not or will not. The patients whose doctors do not
may be disadvantaged, since it is unlikely that PSROs will be able to design a manipula-
tion-proof system. Length of stay review offers a good example. A doctor who requests
a series of short extensions, has a good working relationship with the PSRO reviewer
and, when pressed, takes advantage of the appeals process to secure extra time, can
usually arrange for a longer stay for his patient than otherwise. A patient whose doctor
reluctantly cooperates, if at all, and does not provide data to the PSRO is likely to fare
much worse.
53. See Harris v. Richardson, 357 F. Supp. 242, 246 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1973): "The
Court recognizes that the opinions of examining physicians in Medicare cases are usually




There is also a doctor's interest as a professional in doing his job as he sees
fit.
54
Doctors may not be motivated to contest PSRO requirements which deny
certification for treatment of their patients. Doctors with hospital privileges
are subject to professional discipline imposed by hospital review committees
which may have been responsible for the adverse decision. They have an
interest in remaining in good stead with their colleagues and may modify
their judgment accordingly. To the extent that the PSRO decision is valid,
this is desirable. However, although a doctor may become convinced that
his initial determination was incorrect, the patient may, rightly or wrongly,
wish to contest the PSRO's decision.
3. The Hospital's Position.-A chief concern of institutional providers is
to avoid conflict between patients, doctors and PSROs, a conflict which may
result in uncertainty over whether the patient will be discharged or whether
treatment will be performed in the hospital. Above all, the provider wishes
to avoid retroactive denials of payment, since Medicaid and Medicare pa-
tients may be unable to pay hospital bills from their own resources. Pro-
viders are also interested in keeping hospital beds full and their facilities in
use.
55
4. The PSRO's Position.-The PSRO has its own institutional concerns.
It wishes to do its job as quickly and efficiently as possible, and to maintain
its authority. A PSRO, like any other institution, is unlikely to admit its mis-
takes with enthusiasm. 6
The starting point for PSROs in developing procedures to afford affected
parties "notice" and "reconsideration" is the set of guidelines issued by HEW
. 54. This "interest" is often characterized as the doctor's "right" to practice his pro-
fession without undue interference and has been asserted in the recent court challenges
to federal utilization review programs. See note 20 supra. In rejecting the claim that
the PSRO law inherently invaded this right, Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons
v. Weinberger, No. 73-C-1653 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 1975) distinguished cases striking down
criminal abortion statutes on this ground, such as Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Illinois court observed that a doctor must
comply with the PSRO program only if he wishes to be compensated by the Govern-
ment. However, the court also recognized that the implementation of the PSRO statute
could improperly interfere with the rights of doctors and providers, for example, if
norms were developed without adequate flexibility to permit innovative progress in med-
ical practice. Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, supra, at 10-
11, 17.
55. "Roemer's Law" proposes that utilization expands to fill the beds available. See
M. ROEMER & M. SHAIN, HosPITAL UTILIZATION UNDER INSURANCE (American Hosp.
Ass'n Monograph No. 6, 1959). In one pilot program, the authors learned, the success
of review efforts in shortening lengths of stay resulted in unoccupied hospital beds. The
hospital's concern with possible loss of revenue was communicated to the physician ro-
viewers--each a doctor in need of the hospital to service his patients.
56. See R. KHARAScH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE (1973).
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which are binding as part of the agreement between each PSRO and HEW. 57
HEW has set out the bare bones of a reconsideration process designed to give
the patient a chance for reconsideration before having to leave the hospital.58
Having sketched in the setting in which PSRO determinations are to be
made and having briefly described the possible consequences of PSRO de-
cisions and the interests likely to be involved, the remainder of this article
will explore specific problems facing PSROs in fleshing out their procedures.
Reference to, and discussion of, the HEW guidelines will be made when ap-
propriate, but the intention here is to go beyond a description of the basic pro-
cedural elements which PSROs must include. PSROs cannot hope to fash-
ion procedures which will happily resolve all the conflicting interests de-
scribed above and satisfy all .competing considerations of cost, time, and
soundness of decisions. A balance must be struck, but it must be struck at
a point where the parties possibly adversely affected are given effective no-
tice and a real chance to be heard.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PSRO PROCEDURES
A. Notice Requirements
1. The Need for Notice.-Generous compliance with the requirement
that the PSRO give notice of a determination that proposed services cannot
be certified as medically necessary and appropriate is essential if fair and
workable procedures are to be developed. Notice serves a twofold function,
that of (1) advising the parties of the action which the PSRO proposes,
along with the basis on which its determination is made, and (2) informing
the parties of their right to reconsideration. The giving of notice requires
more than simply telling the parties what the PSRO has decided: an oppor-
tunity must be presented to ascertain and contest the basis of the action.5 9
57. See P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX. (This section of the Manual was issued on Nov.
10, 1974). A PSRO must obtain prior HEW approval before departing from these
guidelines. Id. § 1900.2, at 3.
58. The PSRO determination may be subject to a 24-72 hour grace period for the
reconsideration. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, §§ 1905.5, 1910.4, at 3, 7. "Elective proce-
dures," a term which is not defined by the guidelines, are not reimbursable during this
period. There is uncertainty how HEW will be able to reimburse for any costs of serv-
ices or items provided during this grace period which the PSRO determines are medically
unnecessary or inappropriate. See id. § 1907, at 6. One thing seems clear: when the
patient has remained in the hospital pending review he will have to deal with further ad-
ministrative procedures to secure reimbursement.
59. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). Notice must be tailored to meet
the requirements of the situation in order to provide a real chance to prepare for and
meet the opposition's case and should include notice of the right to reconsideration and
to available assistance. See Escalera v. New York Housing Author., 425 F.2d 853 (2d
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A specific and complete statement of reasons is particularly important be-
cause PSRO review will operate within an extremely short time frame in busy
hospitals involving doctors who typically have full schedules. The more pre-
cise the notice, the sharper the focus of the determination and the more effi-
ciently the review can proceed.
However, if the PSRO process is to succeed, PSROs must approach the
notice-giving task with an understanding of the difficulties they face. Notice
must go to the patients, doctors, and the hospital administration, since each
has different concerns and backgrounds. Notice sufficient for a trained physi-
cian is unlikely to be adequate for a layman.60 Indeed, the problems of pro-
viding meaningful notice to patients may prove insurmountable since patients
usually lack substantive medical knowledge, as well as a familiarity with med-
ical and hospital terminology and procedures. The compressed time period of
review exacerbates these problems. 61 If there is to be any chance that pa-
tients can assert their rights in the reconsideration process, they need the
fullest and most specific notice at the earliest possible time.
6 2
2. Written As Well As Oral Notice.-A written notice is not the only way
to inform parties of a PSRO determination, nor to sharpen the issues.63  Con-
Cir. 1970); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974) (extensive analy-
sis of notice requirements); Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security,
361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973), vacated and remanded on grounds of possible moot-
ness, 417 U.S. 903 (1974). The giving of proper notice is an integral part of the recon-
sideration process: "[T]he right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise
the right may be a barren one." Morgan v. United States, supra, at 18. Notice require-
ments include notice of the basis of the reconsideration decision. See Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 105 (1963).
60. See Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971) (four "specifications"
of surgical incompetence together with hospital case records held sufficient to permit
doctor to answer charges).
61. The PSRO review process may flounder on constitutional shoals for this reason
alone. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which analyzes the need to provide
an effective right to be heard. The Court pointedly observed with respect to a seven
day notice: "We are not prepared to say that the seven day notice currently provided
.. . is constitutionally insufficient per se, although there may be cases where fairness
would require that a longer time be given." Id. at 268. Here the projected time frame
is 24-72 hours. See note 58 supra.
62. Consumer representatives have stressed the need to furnish beneficiaries with
"prompt and specific information, including a specific statement of the facts of the case
and the norms, standards, and criteria involved whenever they disallow any course of
treatment." United States Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, PSROs and Medical
Information--Safeguards to Privacy 4 (July 22, 1974) (presentation of Robert E.
McGarrah). "Beneficiaries must also be promptly informed of their right to any appeal
of the PSRO's decision." Id. at 5. See also Wickman, Public Welfare Administration:
Quest for a Workable Solution, 58 GEo. L.J. 46, 65 (1969) (stressing the importance
of providing full, complete, and early notice).
63. HEW procedures properly contemplate both written notice of the "initial determi-
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ferences and discussions are of great value, as has been recognized in the
pilot programs and reflected in the statute. But oral techniques should
never replace the need for a written notice. 64 The circumstances of in-hospi-
tal review, typified by busy reviewers, a heavy volume of cases, and the in-
volvement of a large number of medical and administrative personnel-in
short, the very circumstances likely to be cited as justification for "unneces-
sary" recordkeeping 5-make keeping a permanent record of PSRO deter-
minations essential. A written notice also permits review and appeal, which
operate to assure consistent and evenhanded decisionmaking. 6 6
3. Training In Notice-Giving.--Since judgments of medical necessity may
rest on complex factors, or on a subjective evaluation of a patient's condi-
tion,67 PSRO reviewers may find it difficult to articulate reasons for their de-
termination. Difficulty in articulation may also mirror a lack of precision
in thought. Notice-givers generally tend to shy away from specifics and to
take refuge in generalities. PSROs are unlikely to be exceptions. It is there-
fore particularly essential to insist on the giving of a complete and precise
notice at the beginning of the program-when standards and precedents will
be developing--even though the volume of notice of adverse determinations
nation" and consultations. The combination of written notice and oral conversation is
"probably the most effective method of communicating with recipients." Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970). However, when verbal notice is provided, notice is
deemed effective from that point and not the time of written notice. See P.S.R.O. Man-
ual ch. XIX, §§ 1905.4, 1905.5, at 5. Thus a party may be deemed to be on notice
when all he knows is that the PSRO has determined not to certify particular treatment.
Written notice of reconsideration decisions must be provided. Id. § 1910.6, at 8.
64. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Elliot v. Weinberger, 371 F.
Supp. 960, 973 (D. Hawaii 1974). Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1974), however, upheld procedures when only
oral notice was provided, but warned:
This is not to say, however, that every pre-termination notice will be constitu-
tionally sound. There may be individual situations in which inadequate notice
is given-in writing as well as orally-and the matter must be considered a
factual question to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 1353. Written notice here is needed if there is to be notice enabling sick patients
to get adequate assistance on technical issues, and enabling busy doctors and hospital
staffs to focus quickly on the problems. A good example of requisite special efforts are
reflected in HEW guidelines requiring foreign language notice. See Sample PSRO Noti-
fication of Adverse Initial Determination, P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, at 11.
65. See Meeting of the National Professional Standards Review Council, Sept. 9,
1974, Washington, D.C., at 62-63 (transcript on record at Office of Professional Stand-
ards Review).
66. The need for review and evaluation, both by the PSRO and outsiders in this new
and virtually untried program, is apparent.
67. For all the projected reliance on objective criteria, these will only be guideposts.
See p. 434-36 infra.
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may be greater at the outset than it will be once the program is established.68
HEW guidelines require that PSRO reviewers use a form of written notice
which leaves a blank space for the "basis for this determination"; PSROs are
instructed to "state basis in detail, specifying the relevant norms and cri-
teria." 69  Without proper training, PSRO reviewers may provide conclusory
statements which do not explain the basis of the decision as to permit effec-
tive rebuttal, and which are therefore legally insufficient. 70 While visiting
several of the operating program models, the authors observed pertinent illus-
trations of such difficulties. The programs visited had printed notice forms,
but used them infrequently. (We should point out that few claims were
formally disapproved by these projects; rather, controversies were "in-
formally" adjusted.) In two programs the notice forms did not provide any
space for listing reasons; 71 another left only two short (5%") lines. When
68. The greatest impact and volume of adverse determination can be expected at the
outset because the initial review winnows out the most obvious problems. Further au-
diting tends to "keep the lid on." Interview with Dr. John Gentry, Executive Medical
Director, Medical Assistance Program, New York City Dep't of Health, New York City,
Sept. 16, 1974.
69, Sample Form of Notice, P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, at 11. The instructions
provide:
The written notice shall state in detail the basis for the determination and spe-
cify the relevant norms and criteria which were applied in making such deter-
mination. The notice should contain sufficient detail to enable the parties to
adequately prepare documentary or other materials to present for the PSRO's
reconsideration.
Id. § 1905.5, at 5 (initial determinations). See also id. § 1910.6, at 8 (reconsiderations).
70. "[O]ne-sentence summary notices are inadequate [to inform a person of the
evidence against him.]" Escalera v. New York City Housing Author., 425 F.2d 853,
862 (2d Cir. 1970) (housing). See cases cited note 61 supra.
71. In one program the printed reason given to the doctor stated:
In line with this goal, we have repeatedly reviewed your patient's progress
during the hospital confinement. This review has been conducted by the
(Program name) Review Coordinator and myself. Based
upon this complete review of the chart and your comments on your patient's
medical progress, I have determined that continued confinement in this hospital
is no longer necessary to improve your patient's medical well being. Accord-
ingly, PSRO certification of your patient's hospital stay will no longer be in
force after:
,19-.
(Generally the doctor was asked to notify the patient).
In another, the form, sent to the patient, states:
Based on your present medical condition, the Foundation has certified your
stay in the hospital as being a responsibility of Medicare for payment up to
and including (date). Continued hospital stay after that date
most likely will be a personal expense chargeable to you rather than the Medi-
care program.
This material was viewed by the authors on site visits to the program models.
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reasons for adverse decisions were articulated, the results varied. Some were
murky, at best: for example, "length of stay exceeded norm; insufficient jus-
tifying material presented. ' 72 Others stated reasons more clearly:
no temperature
no sx except chronic illness
no progress notes
no history of physical
no orders for anything but routine care
Admitted over the telephone by one MD for another.
Written guidelines cannot provide adequate directions for what should be
included in written notices. To do so would require reference to a myriad
of particularized fact situations. This is why PSRO training programs could
be of great use, permitting case by case analysis and asking the reviewers
to put themselves in the positions of the patient, the doctor, and the hospital
administrator when considering the kind of information needed in order to
understand and evaluate an adverse PSRO decision.
4. When Should Notification Be Given: The Role Of The Informal
Conference.-An important consideration in giving formal notice is the use
and effect of an informal consultation. The question which arises here is
whether each party entitled to notice under the statute should likewise be
involved in or at least informed of discussions held between the PSRO and
any other parties. The problem will usually emerge as the aftermath of a
PSRO-doctor conference during which the doctor is persuaded to change his
recommended treatment. HEW guidelines require that written notice be
given when the PSRO makes an "initial determination. s73  But these guide-
lines also direct the PSRO to consult with the attending doctor "prior to the
actual rendering of a PSRO determination. '7 4 It is left to the PSRO's dis-
cretion whether to consult with the patient or provider at this stage. Accord-
ing to the guidelines, consultations between the PSRO and the doctor
[do] not constitute a determination by the PSRO, and if the attend-
ing physician changes his request for services or items to conform to
PSRO requirements, there would be no adverse determination. In
such case, no notice is required to be given the beneficiary or recip-
72. It is impossible to tell from this statement whether the doctor had simply failed
to supply any material to the reviewer, or whether the material he presented lacked per-
suasive power.
73. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1905.4, at 4. The notion of an "initial" determina-
tion, id. § 1905.1, at 3, and a "reconsidered determination," id. § 1910.6, at 8, are HEW
glosses. The statute speaks of a "determination." See § 1159(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-
8(a) (Supp. 111, 1973).
74. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1905.1, at 3, requires this consultation "[i]n case
of a disagreement between the attending physician and the PSRO."
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ient, or the provider, and the beneficiary or recipient or provider
has no right of reconsideration. 75
The rationale is that the PSRO had made no "determination" until it sends
its notice, and it need not send notice until it makes a determination. There-
fore, if it simply convinces the doctor to change his order because of a threat-
ened adverse determination, neither the patient nor the hospital need ever
be told. This handy exercise in circular reasoning is likely to be attacked
by a patient (if he ever finds out) upon the ground that the PSRO's position
as expressed in the "dialogue" constituted a determination, adverse to the pa-
tient, 70 of which he was entitled to be notified, and to ask for reconsidera-
tion.7
7
The problem is a difficult one, for the statute makes separate provisions
for PSRO consultation with doctors. 78 Informal consultation is usually to be
75. Id.
76. That the views expressed by the PSRO are determinations-no matter how re-
spectfully the PSRO listens to the doctor-is implicitly recognized by pilot PSROs. See
Meeting of National Professional Standards Review Council, supra note 65, at 60-61.
Donald C. Harrington of the San Joaquin, California program stated:
For instance, a person is in the hospital for five days, and that is what the
length of stay is. And there is no reason for the person staying on longer.
The Nurse Coordinator takes that person to the physician in charge and says
that patient is not going to be discharged. They call the physician on the case
and he says, oh, yes, I guess I should ....
If we start writing notices to every physician about this, I can see a great
[number] of red flags popping up over the countryside.
Id.
77. At one point, the HEW guidelines seem to suggest that the patient, doctor, and
provider are not parties to the "initial" determination, i.e., the process of PSRO review
of a proposed course of medical action. Section 1900.1 states that "the initial determi-
nation by the PSRO is the action which precipitates the rights of dissatisfied parties . . .
to obtain further review of their claim." P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1900.1, at 1.
This is nonsense; affected parties are given rights intended to assure them a significant
chance to participate in PSRO deliberations.
As the courts have pointed out, when a party has a right to be heard, it has the right
before, not after, the agency's decision has hardened. See, e.g., Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The P.S.R.O. Manual
recognizes that the "parties to the initial determination are all those who have the right
to request PSRO reconsideration of the determination." P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, §
1905.3, at 4.
78. Section 1161, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-10 (Supp. III, 1973) reads:
NOTICE TO PRACTITIONER OR PROVIDER
Whenever any Professional Standards Review Organization takes any ac-
tion or makes any determination-
(a) which denies any request, by a health care practitioner or other provider
of health care services, for approval of a health care service or item proposed
to be ordered or provided by such practitioner or provider; or
(b) that any such practitioner or provider has violated any obligation im-
posed on such practitioner or provider under section 1320c-9 of this title,
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desired, and in any event, difficult to avoid.79 Moreover, an underlying
premise of peer review is that it will work only to the extent that doctors
view it as educative and are willing to cooperate. Yet, doctors' and patients'
interests are not necessarily congruent. The real issue is whether any inter-
est of the patient is served by informing him of the abortive dispute between
his doctor and the PSRO. If the PSRO was right-and the assumption of
the medical profession is that collective wisdom is usually better than individ-
ual judgment-should the patient be encouraged to press for unneeded serv-
ices? But if, for example, local norms set by the PSRO deprive the patient
of the best care possible for his condition, might not a useful exposure of
the issue be avoided in order to avert professional inconvenience or embar-
rassment?
80
Perhaps the solution lies in recognition of the fact that the doctor will be
less likely to be persuaded against his better judgment to change his request
for the patient's treatment if he knows that the patient will be told of the
change and that he will have to explain his reversal. When the doctor is
such organization shall, immediately after taking such action or making such
determination, give notice to such practitioner or provider of such determina-
tion and the basis therefor, and shall provide him with appropriate opportu-
nity for discussion and review of the matter.
The policy of this section favoring consultations may be urged to permit PSROs to con-
sult with doctors before the PSRO gives notice of its determinations, as proposed by
HEW. However, § 1161, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-10 (Supp. II, 1973), requires discussions
after-not before-decisions. It does not authorize PSROs to avoid responsibilities
mandated by § 1159, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8 (Supp. III, 1973). The two are to be read
in tandem. Note that the law gives providers the same rights to discussion and review
as practitioners, but HEW guidelines give special rights to doctors. The guidelines give
only doctors a right to be consulted before an "initial" determination, P.S.R.O. Manual
ch. XIX, § 1905.1, at 3, and they give both doctors and providers a chance for discussion
in addition to the rights to reconsideration. Id. § 1906, at 6.
79. Professor Davis offers a judicious appraisal of informal processes. See K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4.11 (1958). These are informal in the sense that
the trial-like trappings of normal hearings are avoided, but such procedures still involve
all interested parties. Davis also takes a realistic view of ex parte contacts in informal
adjudication. Id. § 13.12 (1970 Supp.). See also id. § 7.12-1 (1970 Supp.). The pro-
ponents of informal consultations argue that efforts should also be made to consult with
patients and providers.
80. The possibility that this would occur was frankly acknowledged during a discus-
sion at the National Professional Standards Review Council, when Dr. M. Duval, for-
merly Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, stated:
[If a physician is in a position to make one of a couple of decisions and he
knows that by making one that he would like to make, he is going to run
against the adverse [PSROI decision, this is going to increase the liability prob-
lems.
Meeting of National Professional Standards Review Council, supra note 65, at 68.
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sincerely convinced by the PSRO that he was wrong initially, he could ex-
plain this to the patient and, if the patient persisted, the doctor could indi-
cate that he would be unwilling to provide treatment any longer.81  While
patients need not be informed whenever the PSRO staff wants to talk with
their doctors,82 patients are entitled to be informed when the result of a
PSRO-doctor conference is a change in the doctor's request for services. s3
The fact is that a doctor may change his recommendations because he
knows that the PSRO is monitoring his decisions. This is the anticipated and
probably desirable effect of PSRO review, but it is important to bear in mind
that this kind of pressure has the effect of enforcing PSRO requirements in
ways which are never subject to notice or reconsideration.
5. Using Notice As An Enforcement Mechanism.--Since one purpose of
the PSRO notification is to inform the parties of their right to reconsideration
before the adverse determination becomes effective, 4 it is important that no-
tice not be given in a way which will induce a patient to give up that right.8 5
The danger is particularly acute since, in addition to their review responsi-
bilities, some PSROs expect to perform discharge planning services.80 Thus
81. Recently, there has been a growing emphasis on respecting the rights of patients
to participate in medical decisions which affect them. See Bunker & Wennburg, Opera-
tion Rates, Mortality, Statistical, and the Quality of Life, 289 NEw ENG. J. OF MED.
1249, 1251 (1973); Katz, Caring for Research-Has Medical Education Failed?, 48
HARv. MED. ALUMNI BULL., July-Aug. 1974, at 11-14. See also S. LAw, BLUE CROSS:
WHAT WENT WRONG? 143 (1974). This emphasis should also be reflected in expanded
conferences between the PSRO and the patient.
82. When the PSRO questions the physician's proposal, but accedes to it, the patient
need not be informed. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1905.1, at 3.
83. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
is illustrative. There, NWRO's right to participate in the administrative review of a sec-
retarial decision concerning a state's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
plan was recognized; NWRO did not, the court ruled, have the right to participate in
the Secretary's informal efforts to bring the state into conformity with the law. How-
ever, HEW was directed to inform NWRO of its reasons for changing its initial require-
ments for the state, and NWRO was to be given a chance to respond.
84. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1905.5, at 5.
85. In the pilot programs, the reviewing organization was sometimes asked by the
doctor to inform patients of the requirement that they leave, thus removing the onus
from the doctor. The patient notice form, see note 71 supra, plainly has the goal of
notifying the patient of the need to leave the hospital and of the availability of planning
help, even though the possibility of an appeal is mentioned.
86. See P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 705.29, at 13. One of the common problems
encountered in the pilot programs reviewing Medicare and Medicaid patients was the
fact that the patients' home situations were inadequate for followup care. It is often ex-
tremely difficult for Medicare patients to find space in long-term care facilities. For
that reason doctors and hospitals face severe pressures to keep a patient who may not
need hospitalization. The PSRO's assumption of this job offered the inducement of this
help to doctors and hospitals in exchange for instituting the utilization review. As pres-
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they have overlapping, and possibly conflicting, responsibilities.8 7 When
part of the PSRO's job is to make arrangements for patients to leave the
hospital, patients may become confused by the PSRO's dual role of advisor
and adjudicator. The patient may therefore assume that notice of an adverse
determination is advice given in a fiduciary capacity.
The HEW sample notice takes pains to spell out the right to reconsidera-
tion."' Additionally, PSROs should explain that a reconsideration can take
place before the certification period ends. But even the most carefully
worded notice will act, in many cases, as an enforcement mechanism. It re-
mains to be seen, then, whether the use of a PSRO as a discharge planner
will identify it as an enforcer to such an extent that its ability to give fair
notice of a chance for review is fatally impaired.
B. The Record On Which PSRO Determinations Are Based
1. Assembling the Record.-An important step in the administrative
process is the collection of a body of relevant materials necessary for making
a decision. Specification by the PSRO of which materials should be con-
sidered in all cases, together with a procedure for recording which materials
have actually been considered in each particular case, will go a long way
toward ensuring predictable, consistent, and evenhanded treatment.8 9
HEW guidelines specify that the persons reviewing an initial PSRO deter-
mination shall, at a minimum, make use of the following information:
(1) The case record which was submitted to the PSRO initially
when the attending practitioner proposed to provide services
or items;
(2) The findings of the PSRO which led to an adverse initial de-
termination;
ently planned, PSROs will trigger, but may not actually perform, discharge planning in
hospitals which are providing this service.
87. Assumption of the discharge planning task raises a number of additional prob-
lems. The PSRO will be adjudicating the necessity for continued hospitalization.
When the PSRO performs such planning, and it is unable to make needed arrangements,
a PSRO decision could be contested on appeal by showing that its own failure to find
suitable after-care makes hospitalization necessary. Moreover, because the same person
may be doing the discharge planning and the initial PSRO reviewing, a possible conflict
of interest may result. See pp. 440-41 infra.
When a hospital review committee performs the PSRO review, even more problems
arise: because the hospital may incur financial risk if the patient stays, its interest in
securing the patient's voluntary departure is even more immediate.
88. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XMX, at 11-12.
89. "Consistency and predictability are values of a high order in the administrative
process, even if they do not rise to the dignity of stare decisis by which courts are
bound." O'Neil, supra note 40, at 189.
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(3) The complete record of the hospital stay of the beneficiary or
recipient;
(4) Any additional documentary information submitted by a party
with its request for reconsideration; and
(5) Any oral presentation which a party or his authorized repre-
sentative may choose to present to the physician or committee
conducting reconsideration.9"
Many pilot programs did not focus on the need to specify what should be
utilized in the record, what sort of record should be kept of each PSRO initial
determination that services should not be provided, and which materials
should be placed before the reviewing body. One result of this haphazard
process was that requests for review submitted by doctors or hospitals were
often well documented and supported by needed records (gathered by the
claimant), enabling reviewing bodies to make judgments in their favor. In
contrast, reviews initiated by patients went largely unsupported because there
was no regularized procedure for identifying what should be presented by the
program staff to reviewers. In such a case, there may have been no doctor
support or only a simple letter from the attending physician stating that there
was a need for review. The medical record was not regularly made avail-
able to subsequent reviewing bodies. By recognizing the need to provide for
assembly of a complete record, the PSRO has taken a significant step toward
procedural fairness.
a. Use of the Review Coordinator.-While HEW guidelines do not spec-
ify the mechanics of PSRO decisionmaking, it is expected that many PSROs
will follow the model of the pilot programs and use the nurse coordinator
to do much of the staff work.91 Under this procedure, the nurse coordinator
90. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.5, at 8. By implication, the PSRO is expected
to use such materials in its initial review. The guidelines state that on reconsideration
the PSRO shall review any materials which were actually taken into account in making
the "initial" determination. They also state that the PSRO can use "any additional evi-
dence submitted to the PSRO or otherwise obtained by the PSRO." Id. However, if
the party requesting review had not been notified of the materials submitted, such mate-
rials could not be used in the "reconsideration process" even if the PSRO initially consid-
ered them. Cf. Escalera v. New York City Housing Author., 425 F.2d 853, 862 (2d
Cir. 1970). See also P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1905.7, at 6. This record of an initial
determination is to include
a copy of the attending physician's request for provision of services or items,
the detailed basis of the determination of the physician or committee which
conducted the review, and a copy of the Notice of Adverse Initial Determina-
tion sent to all the parties.
Id.
91. "Another way to conserve physician time would be through the use of other quali-
fied personnel such as registered nurses who could, under the direction and control of
PSRO physicians, aid in assuring effective and timely review." SENATE REPORT 264.
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or other nonphysician does the initial screening, performs data collection and
recordkeeping functions, and acts as a liaison between the hospital, doctor,
patient, and PSRO. 92 When the coordinator questions the need for an ad-
mission or continued stay, he calls in the PSRO reviewing physician or hospi-
tal review committee. Even though an ultimate PSRO adverse decision will
be made by a doctor, 93 earlier decisions not to question or challenge the length
or type of treatment, which may be equally significant, are made by the co-
ordinator. 94
Because of their central role in the PSRO process, PSRO review co-
ordinators must be trained to keep records which are useful not only for mak-
ing initial PSRO determinations, but also for the purpose of affording notice
and reconsideration. The record should indicate the source of data entered
(e.g., medical record, coordinator's observations, oral or written report of at-
tending doctor or ward nurse) and the events which led to the initial deter-
mination. It should also document whether the coordinator checked with the
attending doctor or sent out notices to affected parties. Finally, if several
HEW guidelines also anticipate that a review coordinator will be used. See P.S.R.O.
Manual ch. VII, § 705.24, at 11. The use of assistants to help in performing the admin-
istrative process has long been judicially approved. See, e.g., NLRB v. Duval Jewelry
Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
92. Typically, the coordinator (1) reviews each new patient's medical file on the
ward, sometimes observing the patient and talking with doctors or nurses treating the
patient at this stage; (2) copies data from the medical record onto the PSRO file; (3)
checks the information secured against PSRO criteria and possibly against his or her
own judgment or information; (4) assigns an initial length of stay for the admission
based on established length of stay norms; (5) checks charts of patients previously ad-
mitted, particularly those who may be nearing the end of their length of stay; (6) re-
views requests for extensions of length of stay or signals the possible need for such a
request to the admitting doctor; (7) discusses problems with the physician advisor or
hospital review committee; (8) performs additional data collecting and recordkeeping
functions. The coordinators in pilot projects usually dealt with patient questions about
PSRO decisions, and with minor doctor and hospital inquiries. Normally the PSRO re-
viewing doctors, staff director, and officials dealt with the more serious informal chal-
lenges by doctors and hospitals.
93. This is never explicitly stated in HEW guidelines, but is assumed. See P.S.R.O.
Manual ch. VII, § 705.24, at 11. The statute specifies that only the "duly licensed doc-
tor of medicine . . . [can] make final determinations . . . with respect to the profes-
sional conduct of [another] . . . doctor . . . or any act performed by any . . . doctor
. . . in the exercise of his profession." § 1155(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(c) (Supp. III,
1973). Both the "initial" and "reconsidered" determinations are final if not further
challenged. See P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, §§ 1905.6, 1910.7, at 6, 9. Thus it would
appear that only a doctor could make an initial adverse decision. It is beyond question
that only a doctor can make a decision on reconsideration. Indeed, it would be pro-
grammatically unacceptable for nonphysicians to formally reverse doctors.
94. In a major pilot program, approximately 10% of the cases screened by the nurse
coordinator were referred to the physician advisor. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 671.
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people participate in the determination through conferences or consultations
(whether or not in the presence of the coordinator) the record should show
what took place at these encounters, and whether they occurred in person
or by telephone.
b. Use of Medical Record.-HEW guidelines anticipate that medical
records will be a primary source of data.95 The pilot projects did not often
use the medical record itself, but relied on excerpts copied from the medical
record. Such practices run the risk of added error in copying;96 in addition,
data which might be useful to the physician reviewer could be overlooked
or misunderstood by the copier. PSRO determinations require a full picture
of the patient's condition. Thus, in the initial as well as the review de-
terminations, the medical record itself should be made available to, and used
by, the decider. Even so, the PSRO reviewer must remember that the infor-
mation recorded on the chart may not be extensive enough to allow a reliable
judgment. 9
7
c. Use of Physical Examination.--Since the scope of the PSRO investiga-
tive power has not been precisely drawn, the question arises whether PSRO
delegates can or should be able to examine the patient (or even whether data
collected by the PSRO from the patient may be used in its decisionmaking
process). 98  It is not difficult to predict the source of a number of serious
objections. Doctors may object on grounds that examination of the patient
interferes with the attending doctor-patient relationship. Lawyers may in-
quire whether there is an impermissible overlap between adjudicatory and
investigative functions. And the patient may argue that such an examination
constitutes an invasion of his privacy. Certainly examination by the PSRO
physician reviewer or data collection by the PSRO reviewer should be per-
mitted when the patient himself requests it--even if his doctor opposes it.
95. See P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 705.18, at 8-9. The guidelines also anticipate
that the PSRO will document its actions in the medical record, thus creating a permanent
record. Id. § 705.19, at 9. This is quite a departure from the usual procedure, since
the medical record is generally believed to be the sacred preserve of the doctors and
nurses who perform the treatment.
96. The potential for loss or inaccuracy increases each time the record is abstracted.
See Henrickson & Myers, Some Sources and Potential Consequences of Errors in Medi-
cal Data Recording, 12 METHODS OF INFORMATION IN MED. 318-45 (1973).
97. Interview with Dr. Howard Katz, Medical Examiner, Medical Assistance Pro-
gram, New York City Dep't of Health, New York City, June 25, 1974.
98. HEW guidelines are silent on this point. In Pippin v. Richardson, 349 F. Supp.
1365, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 1972), the court implicitly criticized the reviewing agency "which
reviewed the medical records and never had any personal contact with the patient her-
self." See also Simms v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 321 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (nonexamin-
ing review doctor opinion is not substantial evidence when contrary to medical opinions
of examining doctors).
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When the doctor requests a PSRO examination, the matter could be resolved
as an ordinary consultation would be, by securing the patient's consent.
However, the patient must be told of the purpose of the examination, so that
the PSRO can decide if the proposed treatment will be reimbursable, and
whether the examination is optional. At the present time, examinations play
no part in existing review mechanisms. 99
Since the condition of the patient is the basic subject of the proceeding,
examination should be encouraged. The PSRO should request the coopera-
tion of the doctor and patient, but should take care not to pressure the pa-
tient. If the patient does not agree, the PSRO would have to make the
best decision possible on the basis of other available data. While it is not
uncommon for patients to be required to relinquish their privacy rights, 100
PSRO regulation already imposes new burdens on patients. Since review ex-
aminations are not the usual practice, a modest consensual beginning seems
in order.
2. Use of Norms and Criteria.-An important goal of the PSRO program
is to develop norms and criteria based on patterns of practice in PSRO areas
to serve as guideposts to PSRO decisionmaking. These measures are in-
tended to provide a scientific and standardized foundation for PSRO review
to replace the subjective judgments of individual reviewing personnel.' 0' Ob-
jectivity is certainly a valid goal for administrative decisionmaking. The
problem is that attempts to achieve this laudable ideal in peer review could
result in serious unfairness simply because the state of the art in medicine
does not permit the development of norms and criteria capable of replacing
the need for case by case judgment.
The statute, however, directs PSROs to develop norms, criteria, and stand-
ards' 0 2 with respect to the treatment of particular illnesses and health condi-
99. In rare instances, if any, have pilot programs used examinations as a fact-gath-
ering technique. It is not the usual practice for doctors to examine private patients in
the hospital without the permission of the attending doctor, but since the courts have
imposed a greater measure of legal responsibility on hospitals for medical care taking
place on the premises, this practice may change. When the appropriate length of stay
is at issue, however, the condition of the patient is the major factor and a physical ex-
amination may be particularly significant.
100. Patients in teaching hospitals are often used as teaching subjects, and the gov-
ernment calls for examination of patients in disability cases. See Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389 (1971).
101. See SENATE REPORT 254. Thus the statute states that the PSROs "shall apply
professionally developed norms of care, diagnosis, and treatment . . . as principal points
of evaluation and review." § 1156(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. I, 1973).
102. In "PSRO-land" it is essential to know the difference between norms, criteria,
and standards. All of these are defined in the P.S.R.O. Manual as follows:
Norms-Medical care appraisal norms are numerical or statistical measures of
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tions, including the appropriateness of various facilities for services, 103 and
for patient lengths of stay in hospitals. 104 These standards may be based
on the consensus judgment of physicians in the community (as was generally
the case with the pilot projects) or on empirical evidence that a given act
results in a desired outcome. 10 5 Both methods, unfortunately, are seriously
deficient. Since much of the practice of medicine is based on conventional
wisdom, unproven by controlled clinical trials,10 6 standards developed by con-
sensus judgment may not relate to the patient's outcome and may tend to
freeze the form of medical practice at less than an optimum level.' 07 Em-
pirically proven process standards, although preferable to consensus judg-
ments, are extremely complex and difficult to develop and apply to individual
patients.' 0 Most patients do not present the classic symptoms. Thus, even
if empirically based criteria were universally accepted, the way in which they
were applied in individual cases could be a matter of honest disagreement
among competent doctors.
Moreover, an important reason for questioning the value of norms and cri-
teria in PSRO review is the result of a study which shows that whether a
doctor's work is acceptable to reviewers varies with the kind of criteria that
is used.' 0 9 Thus the same doctor's performance could be rated acceptable
under some kinds of criteria and unacceptable under others.
One area in which objective criteria may be more easily developed, how-
usual observed performance.
Standards-Standards are professionally developed expressions of the range of
acceptable variation from a norm or criterion.
Criteria-Medical care criteria are predetermined elements against which as-
pects of the quality of a medical service may be compared. They are devel-
oped by professionals relying on professional expertise and on the professional
literature.
P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 709, at 16. Medical practice in individual cases is to be
measured against a consensus of what doctors in the area did in similar cases.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
104. Id. § 1156(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(d)(2).
105. Standards which are based on descriptions of what doctors actually do for simi-
lar patients in the community are called process standards. It is expected that PSROs
will use process standards. See B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 14, at 15. An
alternate method of developing standards is based on outcome measures (i.e., whether
the patient gets well), but these are even more complex and are too expensive to be
used by PSROs. See Brook, supra note 22, at 30.
106. See Brook, supra note 22, at 30-31.
107. See White, Caveats for PSROs, 120 WE.ST. J. MED. 338, 343 (1974). Medical
authorities question many of the assumptions behind the PSRO program, particularly the
emphasis on "process" standards directed at physicians' practices.
108. See Brook, supra note 22, at 30.
109. See Brook, Choosing a Method of Peer Review, 288 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1323
(1973).
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ever, is length of stay standards. Based on only one relatively uncomplicated
set of variables, the number of days in the hospital, these standards would
not necessarily be any more accurate than other consensus standards, but
they would at least be easier to apply in practice. 110
Because scientific precision in medical practice is still restricted, it would
seem that PSROs should make only limited use of norms, standards, and cri-
teria. Ideally these would be used in conjunction with more subjective con-
siderations. This view is reflected by the pilot project evaluators who suggest
that
[t]he logistics of peer review . . . can be significantly aided through
preliminary screening against explicit criteria by nurse coordinators
or medical record librarians (with or without computer assistance).
The limited subset of cases which fail to pass such screening require
judgmental review by peers. Review programs which combine ini-
tial screening and peer review of detected exceptions utilize the best
advantages of both explicit and implicit criteria."'
In implementing a system using both objective and subjective judgments,
each PSRO will decide the weight it will give norms and criteria. Once at-
tention is drawn to a case through use of a screening norm, should the at-
tending doctor be required to justify each proposed departure from the
norm, or should the PSRO be expected to justify why in the particular case
it believes departure from the norm is not medically necessary or appro-
priate?" 2 When a norm relates to a relatively uncomplicated set of variables,
110. Extensive data on lengths of stay has been published by third party payors and
service organizations such as the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities,
a nonprofit corporation sponsored by the American College of Physicians, American
College of Surgeons, American Hospital Association, and the Southwestern Michigan
Hospital Council. See Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities, Length of
Stay in PAS Hospitals, United States, Regional 1969 (1970).
111. B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 24, at 19. HEW guidelines reflect this
view. The P.S.R.O. Manual states:
Norms, criteria, and standards should be used in each type of PSRO review.
They should, at least, be used for the initial screening of cases to select those
cases requiring more in-depth review. In-depth review should be performed by
peers using a combination of more detailed norms, criteria and standards and
an assessment of a patient's individual clinical and social situation and the re-
sources of the institution in which care is being provided.
P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 709, at 17.
112. The appropriate use of norms and standards may differ when the PSRO is look-
ing at the pattern of practice of doctors and providers under § 1155(2)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320c-4(a)(4) (Supp. III, 1973). These decisions are not being made with respect
to care for any individual patient, but rather whether the doctor or the institution is,
in general, providing care which differs from others in the area. The extent to which
it is appropriate to hold doctors to such a standard can be debated, but that is the aim
of the PSRO law. See SENATE REPORT 262.
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as in the case of hospital length of stay norms, it may be appropriate to re-
quire the doctor to explain why he proposes to depart from the standard.
But when the norm relates to a complex and inexact set of variables, the
PSRO should probably be expected to examine the individual case care-
fully and then justify its views to the attending physician. 113
3. Norm-Setting As Rulemaking.-Even if the use of norms, standards,
and criteria is limited, the process of their development is of tremendous im-
portance to the doctors, hospitals, and patients who will be affected.' 1 4
Statutory recognition of these interests" 5 suggests that the parties should be
given an opportunity to be heard during the developmental process. 1 6
Other interests groups, such as consumer groups and health care organiza-
tions, might also make useful contributions.
113. This approach would follow from the warning of the Senate Committee on the
use of norms:
This professionally determined time of certification of need for continued care
is a logical checkpoint for the attending physician and is not to be construed
as a barrier to further necessary hospital care. Neither should the use of
norms as checkpoints, nor any other activity of the PSRO, be used to stifle
innovative medical practice or procedures. The intent is not conformism in
medical practice-the objective is reasonableness.
SENATE REPORT 263.
114. The PSRO statute requires that norms be "professionally developed." § 1156
(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (Supp. III, 1973). A local PSRO's norms are to accord
with regional norms set by the PSRO council. Id. HEW's contemplated procedure is
that the Secretary of HEW and the National PSRO Council will supply sample norms,
criteria and standards. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 709.11, at 17. Each PSRO will set
up local committees which will consult with specialty groups and determine appropriate
guides. Id. § 709.12, at 17. (This was the procedure followed by the EMCROs. See
B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 24, at 40-41). Then the PSRO will approve and
disseminate these guides. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. VII, § 709.21, at 19. The PSRO will
also plan for periodic modification. Id. § 709.32, at 20. HEW guidelines do not pro-
vide for participation by providers, patients, or members of the public generally.
115. These are reflected in the provisions of section 1159, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8
(Supp. III, 1973), and section 1161, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-10 (Supp. III, 1973). Evaluators
of the EMCROs stress the need for the participation of as many doctors as possible to
achieve valid and accepted criteria. B. DECKER & P. BONNER, supra note 24, at 105.
116. See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 843 (1966), which indicates a possible basis for this right. In that case, the
airlines had a statutory right to a formal adjudicatory hearing on license applications.
The agency had decided certain issues relating to the airlines' licenses (involving the ex-
tent of rights to sell cargo space at wholesale rates) by rulemaking procedures which did
not include an adversary hearing, but did include a chance for an oral presentation. The
court held that the rulemaking procedures were appropriate, and satisfied the applicant's
rights. The analogous argument can be made that the PSROs decide certain issues by
the issuance of norms, i.e., which cases may require additional justification. Parties
given a right to procedural protections in the decisionmaking process of PSROs, there-
fore, have a right to some procedural protections in the rule-adopting process.
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The concept of administrative rulemaking offers appropriate procedural
analogues for participation of these parties in the development of standards.
Rulemaking is typically concerned with broad policy considerations rather
than review of individual conduct, and is designed to permit the participation
of many persons with different interests. 117 Procedures in rulemaking are
simple-notice of the issues to 'be determined is provided and an opportunity
to make written and, often, oral submissions is given.118 Even if they are
not required to do so, PSROs should adopt some variant of these procedures
to safeguard affected interests and develop as accurate and widely accepted
standards as possible.
III. THE "RECONSIDERATION" PROCESS
A. Who Should Consider-And Reconsider
PSROs are required to make determinations and then to provide an op-
portunity for reconsideration. An important issue is deciding who should
117. See, e.g., K. DAvIs, supra note 32, § 6.01. Davis strongly advocates wide use
of rulemaking, id. § 6.13, (1970 Supp.), and believes it should be used by local agencies,
particularly in administering public welfare programs. Id. § 6.20.
118. Such rulemaking procedures are required for some federal agencies. The ques-
tion arises whether actions of the National PSRO Council, taken with the Secretary of
HEW, in adopting national guidelines for norms, standards, and procedures may be sub-
ject to some rulemaking requirements. An argument can be made that they are, but
the courts are likely to hold otherwise because of uncertainty of each of several steps
in the argument.
Federal agencies must cope with rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act unless subject to an exception. One such exception pertains to matters relat-
ing to grants or benefits. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1970). A threshold question is
whether APA rulemaking procedures apply to the Secretary of HEW for Social Security
Act programs. The answer is not clear. In Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson,
356 F. Supp. 1338, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 1973), af!'d sub nom. Johnson's Professional Nurs-
ing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1974), the court, on the authority of
Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971)
(AFDC), held that Medicaid rules were not subject to the APA because Medicaid is
a grant program.
However, unlike Medicaid, Medicare is not a grant program to the states. Given the
thrust of cases decided under Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), emphasizing the
entitlement of recipients of social security programs, it would seem that Medicare pay-
ments are not to be viewed as grants and that the exception to rulemaking requirements
is not applicable to regulations which affect Medicare recipients. National guidelines
for PSROs affect both Medicare and Medicaid recipients. Thus it could be argued that
the exception to APA rulemaking requirements does not affect the Secretary's responsi-
bilities here. Whether the participation of the National PSRO Council removes the mat-
ter from the ambit of the APA is another arguable question. In fact, the Secretary of
HEW has rule-issuing authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), which does not provide
for procedures similar to APA rulemaking. Furthermore, he has not issued regulations
with respect to procedures for his rulemaking.
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perform each function. The statute provides that licensed doctors shall make
final PSRO determinations.' 1 9 The legislative history reveals that the Con-
gress anticipated that computers and nondoctor reviewers would also play
a role in the decisionmaking process. 120  However, whether a nonphysician
could make what HEW calls an "initial determination'' z is almost academic
since the program rests upon the concept of peer review and the medical
community has made it plain that doctors will make the final decisions with
respect to doctors' practices. But as already developed in the above discus-
sion of the use of review coordinators, doctors will not be making all of the
decisions, or even all of the important decisions.
In order to make a fair and reasonable determination, the reviewing physi-
cian must be thoroughly familiar with the record.' 22 If, for example, the re-
view coordinator collects the data, applies the norms, consults with the at-
tending physician, and then after securing the doctor's approval, writes the
notice, it would be questionable whether the physician had sufficiently per-
formed his statutory duty of peer review. The authors' experience with the
pilot programs suggests that such a limited physician's role may be contem-
plated by some programs. A significant number of physician advisors were
found to have billed between 15 minutes and one hour a week.' 23  Thus it
119. § 1155(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(c) (Supp. III, 1973). See p. 432 supra. The
most basic requisite is that any PSRO reviewer must be disinterested in the sense of hav-
ing no preliminary interest in the case. Id. § 1155(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4(a)(6).
Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973). It should be noted that even if the re-
viewing doctor does not have a direct financial interest in the fee to be paid the admitting
doctor, there may still be an indirect pecuniary interest. Reviewing doctors may be de-
pendent on other doctors for referrals, or they may be reviewing the decisions of doctors
for whom they "cover" at night or weekends. Particularly in some smaller communities,
there may be no completely "disinterested" doctors.
120. SENATE REPORT 264.
121. The statute implies that nonphysicians could not make the "initial" determina-
tion since that decision is final unless reconsideration is requested.
122. See Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 361 F. Supp.
782, 790 (D.N.H. 1973), in which the benefits were terminated by a certifying officer
who "personally gathered no facts relative . . . to making his determination." The court
criticized the separation of the factfinding from the decisionmaking process as fatal to
the adequacy of the procedures.
123. Five pilot programs with admission review programs supplied the following data
on hours billed by physician advisors:
Program One: Of the 25 to 30 advisors doing the bulk of the work, 10
bill for 10 hours per week; the others average 1 hour per
week.
Program Two: The 24 advisors work to 2 hours per week.
Program Three: The advisors work a maximum of 1 to 1/ hours per
week, and in the smaller hospitals as little as 15 minutes
per week.
Program Four: Hours range from full-time at a County Hospital to 5
minutes per day.
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may be implied that the review coordinator rather than the doctor was ac-
tually doing the deciding.
Serious problems may be anticipated in securing enough PSRO physician
reviewers to complete on the spot review of the record in the short time
period established for PSRO initial determinations. These problems are
likely to increase if PSROs increase the scope of their activities beyond rela-
tively simple length of stay and admission reviews. Nevertheless, these diffi-
culties cannot be solved by improper delegation of the PSRO physician re-
viewer's responsibilities, for this violates the affected parties' right to have
the decider make his determination on the basis of the record and not on
the basis of what someone else tells him is in the record.
12 4
1. A Disinterested Reconsideration.-While a PSRO must take care not
to separate its initial decisionmaking and factfinding functions, it must also
be sure that these are kept separate from its reconsidering functions. A re-
viewer should not "reconsider" a decision in which he originally participated;
the reviewer may be biased in favor of his own prior decision.
125 HEW
guidelines caution that the reconsiderer "shall have had no previous associa-
tion with the initial determination."'
1 26
Satisfaction of this requirement may prove difficult, particularly when the
PSRO has delegated the reviewing function to an institutional review commit-
tee and the entire institutional review committee made the initial determina-
tion. Although a PSRO board could conduct the reconsideration, a question
arises whether the use of a PSRO board improperly limits the statutory man-
date for institutional review committees. HEW guidelines do nothing to
clarify these issues. They require an independent reconsideration, yet also
contemplate that the entire decisionmaking process (including the recon-
sideration) may be carved out by institutional review committees. 12 7  The
use of a single member of the review committee as the initial decider, with
the entire committee as a reconsidering body, may be a solution to this prob-
lem, at least as long as the initial decider does not participate as a member
Program Five: In October 1974, 50 advisors billed for a total of 72
hours and 40 minutes, at a maximum of one hour per
day.
Program Six: As little as 15 to 20 minutes per month in some cases.
See Nelson, supra note 27, at 671. In the On-Site Concurrent Hospitalization Utiliza-
tion Review (OSCHUR) program, an average of 0.16 physician hours are spent review-
ing each case referred to the physician advisor.
124. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
125. See id. See also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
126. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.4, at 7.




of the reconsidering 'body.' 28
2. The Decider and Reviewer As Experts.-Doctors who sit as deciders
or reviewers for PSROs may be disinterested in some sense of the term, i.e.,
they may not have participated in the case before, but they will, of course,
bring to the process their own expertise. This fact raises various problems.
When, for example, the attending physician is a specialist, should his medi-
cal decisions be reviewed by doctors who do not have similar training and
experience? On the other hand, can workable procedures be developed if
the PSRO must find a similarly qualified specialist to review, and another
to reconsider the initial decision in contested cases? 129  The appropriate
answer is likely to be different in large urban areas with numerous specialists
than in smaller communities. Certainly, if the reviewing doctor is not a simi-
larly qualified specialist, greater weight should be given the attending doctor's
judgment than in a situation in which a specialist performs the review.
A less recognized aspect of doctors bringing their expertise to bear in ad-
ministrative decisionmaking is their tendency to supply their own knowledge
of the facts. 130 It is true that a basic justification of administrative decision-
making is that it permits qualified experts to apply their knowledge to com-
plex problems needing specialized experience. Yet when doctors not only
make use of their own knowledge of medical treatment but also of other mat-
128. Since issuance of the directive in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970),
that the decisionmaker be impartial, courts have considered its application in similar cir-
cumstances. Some degree of prior involvement has been permitted. In Escalera v. New
York City Housing Author., 425 F.2d 8.53, 863 (2d Cir. 1970), the court permitted a
panel to reconsider a decision even though it had approved the recommended initial deci-
sion. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
The prior participation of medical staff in doctors' disciplinary proceedings was con-
sidered in Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.
1974). The doctor contended that members of the hospital's governing board were
barred from presiding at the disciplinary hearing because they had approved the Surgery
Department's recommendation to institute the proceedings. The court held that there
had not been a due process violation, pointing out that administrative and judicial tri-
bunals are often called upon to retry cases. Id. at 517. Accord, Woodbury v. McKin-
non, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971). However, the degree of prior involvement is mark-
edly greater where PSROs have already weighed the evidence. Moreover, the statute
contemplates a new look at the case, which is best achieved by having a new reviewer.
See Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 361 F. Supp. 782, 797
(D.N.H. 1973).
129. HEW guidelines specify that the person reconsidering must "be of at least equal
expertise to the physician or committee who made the initial determination." P.S.R.O.
Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.4, at 7.
130. Professional bodies reviewing the competence of doctors are generally permitted
to apply their own expert opinions in the decision process. See, e.g., Woodbury v.
McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Jaffe v. State Dep't of Health, 135 Conn.
339, 64 A.2d 330 (1949).
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ters--such as prior observation of another doctor's mode of practice' 81-
great care must be taken to ensure that the parties get an adequate chance
to rebut the basis of the PSRO decision. A PSRO must therefore be certain
to include in its notice a full statement of all the factors (including the profes-
sional knowledge of the decider) on which the initial decision was based so
that each party will have an opportunity to respond. During any oral re-
consideration proceedings and in the actual reconsideration decision, the re-
viewers should similarly take pains to articulate any inputs of their own.
18 2
B. The Form of Hearing Needed to Resolve
The Issues Facing PSROs
The crux of the fair procedures mandated for PSROs is the statutory pro-
vision which affords the affected parties a "reconsideration."' 83 One of the
hardest questions to resolve is what should take place at this reconsideration.
Can the PSRO conduct its reconsideration solely on the basis of documents
and records before it? Is it necessary to permit oral presentations? Should
a conference be held? Is a trial-type hearing with the taking of evidence and
cross-examination required, and who should be present-the attending doc-
tor, hospital officials, the patient or his representatives?
HEW guidelines provide only nominal guidance: they neither require nor
bar a hearing involving cross-examination; they permit, but do not require,
the presence of all parties. They do, however, direct that "any oral presen-
tation which a party or his authorized representative may choose to present"
be considered. 18 4 Pilot projects similarly offer little guidance as to the types
of procedures likely to be required for PSRO reconsiderations. Review was
considered a matter to be resolved by informal discussions among physicians.
There were few, if any, records of the subjects of these discussions. Formal
adverse determinations occurred infrequently. 135
131. The authors observed that doctors sitting on a review committee did contribute
their own impressions of the competence of the physicians involved. This is also a prob-
lem faced by review coordinators, physician reviewers and PSRO administrators. Nurse
coordinators and physician reviewers confided that they "knew" which doctor's cases
should be looked at carefully. Administrators familiar with reviews among several hos,
pitals were often equally able to identify doctors they felt needed "special" oversight.
132. See Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 973 (D. Hawaii 1973), in which
the court stressed the need for the agency to give the claimant "any additional informa-
tion" it had which would clarify complex issues. Time constraints in the proposed
PSRO process do not permit advance notice to patients by the reviewers of their inputs,
but the extent to which such inputs are made may affect the fairness of the opportunity
to be heard, at least when the patient has no expert help.
133. § 1159a, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-8(a) (Supp. rn , 1973), quoted note 9 supra.
134. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.5, at 8. The Manual goes on to note, how-
ever, that "[a] reconsideration is not a formal adversary process." Id.
135. See note 27 supra.
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Recent cases, beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly,186 have considered what
procedures are required to give recipients of government benefit programs
a meaningful opportunity to be heard before those benefits may be cut off.
In Goldberg the Court required
that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the rea-
sons for a proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to
defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his
own arguments and evidence orally.1
3 7
With welfare benefits the subject of the administrative procedures in Gold-
berg, the Court stressed the "brutal need" of the recipients in requiring pro-
cedures sufficient to ensure that sound decisions were made. Since the op-
portunity for timely medical care may be at stake in PSRO determinations,
procedures should be fashioned to satisfy this objective. 138
When applying Goldberg to other cases involving government benefit de-
terminations, the courts have not uniformly required trial-type hearings.' 89
136. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg the issue before the Court was whether wel-
fare recipients had a right to an evidentiary hearing prior, rather than subsequent, to
termination of benefits. Since the Social Security Act required that a "fair hearing" be
held by the states before termination was final, there was no question of the right to
such a hearing at some point in the process.
137. Id. at 267-68.
138. Even though an adverse PSRO decision may be reversed at a later hearing by
the Secretary, the patient may be seriously disadvantaged because no treatment was pro-
vided in the interim. For further discussion of the patient's need to be heard, see Silver,
Medical Care Delivery Systems and the Poor: New Challenges for Poverty Lawyers,
1970 Wis. L. REV. 644.
In Goldberg, due process requirements were deemed to demand a prior hearing in part
because of the "brutal need" of the welfare recipient. Significantly, however, the Court
has rejected a narrow doctrine that would limit the due process requirement of a prior
hearing to cases involving necessities. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
However, the Court has stated that "medical care is as much 'a basic necessity of life'
to an indigent as welfare assistance." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 259 (1974). Moreover, in the case of PSROs, basic due process is mandated by
the statute. See p. 417 supra. Thus, it is not necessary to discuss whether in-patient
PSRO review involves a determination of entitlement (to which lesser due process re-
quirements usually attach) or a termination of benefits. See Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Health & Social Services, 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (need to give provider
evidentiary hearing concerning patient removal).
139. The Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972), declined
an opportunity to decide the constitutionality of regulations which did not provide for
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of disability benefits. Because the chal-
lenged regulations had recently been superseded, the Court vacated the lower Court's
opinion with instructions to remand to the administrative agency, remarking that if the
administrative process "results in a determination of entitlement to disability benefits,
there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that claimants are entitled to
make an oral presentation." Id. at 209. But evidentiary hearings were required before
medical related benefits were terminated in Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121
(10th Cir. 1973) (termination of Medicare); Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520
(W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3383
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They have required an effective opportunity for confrontation, which could
include cross-examination of adverse witnesses when factual evidence is in-
volved. However, the courts stress that this opportunity may be offered in
informal and nontraditional ways. When the courts have not required cross-
examination, the basic objective of cross-examination had been satisfied by
less formal procedures. 140  The underlying question is whether the issues in-
volved require cross-examination or confrontation of witnesses for a satisfac-
tory resolution of the dispute, or whether the evidentiary materials developed
with respect to medical care issues are so different from the materials pre-
sented in other public welfare programs as to eliminate the possible need for
confrontation and cross-examination. An examination of recent cases involv-
ing medical care issues similar to those likely to arise in PSRO proceedings
suggests that provision must be made for oral presentations by the parties,
which, at least in some cases, will require confrontation or cross-examination
or both. Medical evidence is neither inherently probative nor generally un-
conflicting, and it often raises factual issues of the sort that should be de-
termined at an evidentiary hearing.' 4 1  Naturally, if PSRO determinations
(U.S. Jan. 14, 1975) (disability); Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ga.
1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3175
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1974) (disability). Providers have also been successful in claiming some
hearing rights. See Coral Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp.
646 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
The courts have not required hearings prior to a suspension of provider payments.
See Wilson Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross, 494 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1974); Langhorne
Gardens, Inc. v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Russi v. Weinberger,
373 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Va. 1974).
140. See Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the court
held that because of the nature of the charges (professional incompetence) and the na-
ture of the hearing (informal discussion of medical records with no witnesses), cross-
examination was not required. The court stated:
Dr. Woodbury was in a familiar setting, with familiar people, discussing a
familiar subject. His expertise and acquaintance with the facts of each case
thoroughly qualified him to be effective in discussion with his fellow doctors
Id. at 844. In other cases involving disciplinary action against a doctor, courts have
required more formal procedures, including cross-examination. See, e.g., Duffield v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974); Christhilf v. An-
napolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974).
141. For example, in Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1973),
a! 'd, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3383 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1975) rights to disability payments were contested. Medical evidence on record was at
the core of the dispute. The Government argued that no hearing was needed because
medical evidence is highly probative and "justifies a different due process standard than
in the case of welfare recipients in which 'rumor and gossip' are more likely to form
the basis of an adverse decision." Id. at 524. But the court observed that in reality medi-
cal evidence is often conflicting and a hearing often helps resolve the issues. It con-
cluded that the value of a hearing was "self evident" because the decider must use his
own judgment in resolving conflicting medical evidence. Id.
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do not involve contested factual matters, such procedural opportunities need
not be given.
142
As the Court emphasized in Goldberg, procedures "must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 43  If a patient
has requested reconsideration, an informal medical conference may not af-
ford due process, particularly in the absence of any representative capable
of participating on the patient's behalf. More formal procedures, with the
traditional safeguards of counsel and cross-examination are more likely to ar-
rive at the truth. 144 Thus the decision about the kind of hearing which
PSROs shall hold should focus on who is to be present and the ways in which
each can meaningfully participate.
C. Participation At Reconsiderations
HEW guidelines do not require that any of the parties be present at a re-
consideration. 145  But the presence of all involved individuals may be either
useful or necessary for an intelligent reappraisal. PSROs should therefore
be provided a means for requesting or requiring their attendance. They are
not given subpoena power by statute, possibly a flaw fatal to their ability to
offer fair proceedings if needed parties refuse to attend. However, they can
make requests and use their powers of persuasion with doctors and hospital
personnel. And attendance of their own employees (such as review co-
ordinators) and the physician reviewers is within their control.
In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the court pointed out that medical
evidence is often conflicting and that cross-examination may therefore be needed. It
recognized the reliability and probative worth of medical reports, and permitted their use
subject to cross-examination at the request of the claimant. It did not, however, require
the doctor to testify.
142. See Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1972) (no
dispute about accuracy of medical records used in disciplinary proceeding).
143. 397 U.S. at 268-69.
144. The courts have observed that when factual issues are the basis of an appraisal
of the quality of medical care, there is a need for an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in Citta
v. Delaware Valley Hospital, 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970), the court found a need
for an evidentiary hearing on the underlying factual issues:
[What actually occurred on the operating table, the patient's condition, what
the surgeon observed and the reasons for the medical and surgical judgments
made, are all matters determinable only by an investigation of their critical
factual bases. The operating surgeon is in possession of almost all the facts
necessary to evaluate the decisions he himself made. He is responsible for the
"paper trail" of the patient's treatment, the charts and other records prescribed
by standard hospital procedure. All of the facts underlying his judgment must
be known before his care of the patient can be evaluated with any certainty.
Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
145. The guidelines do direct that a single reconsideration be held "at a time con-
venient for all parties." P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.4, at 7.
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The admitting doctor's participation should particularly be encouraged so
that the PSRO educative function can best be performed. The doctor's own
interests are also likely to be best served since he will be given a first hand
opportunity to explain his actions. 146  Moreover, other parties' interests are
served by his attendance. The patient is helped because the doctor is able
to supply the needed information to aid in a correct determination of the pa-
tient's medical needs. Furthermore, the likelihood of a conflict between the
doctor and the PSRO as to whether the patient should stay in the hospital
will be reduced.
The review coordinator and the physician reviewer should also be present,
particularly when they have developed factual materials which are in the
record. If, for example, observations of the patient by the nurse coordinator
or the reviewer are in issue, the claimants should be given an opportunity
to test them by confrontation or cross-examination. The PSRO deciders
themselves have an interest in defending their decision, an interest which they
should appropriately represent, leaving the reconsideration reviewers free to
consider the matter anew.
The patient's presence has two aspects. As the subject of the inquiry, he
may be a source of evidence. As such, however, his actual presence at the
reconsideration is not needed; only the chance for an examination prior to
reconsideration is necessary. But his presence as a party advocate may also
be relevant. In some cases he will be appealing together with his doctor.
In others his doctor will either be neutral or will have been convinced by the
PSRO to change his views. In any event, the importance of the right to pre-
sent evidence and talk directly to the decider was stressed in Goldberg.
14 7
In practice, a patient may be too ill, as well as deficient in background and
training, to do much effective advocating. HEW guidelines thus permit his
acting through a representative.1 48  Some patients may choose to retain a
lawyer;149 alternatively it has been suggested that a lay advocate may be use-
146. Informal talks between review board members and some of the parties prior to
the hearing cannot replace their presence at the reconsideration, and may prejudice other
parties' rights. Although there is a statutory mandate that the PSRO consult with the
doctor and the provider after a determination that his proposed case is not necessary
or appropriate, the PSRO should not permit these discussions to substitute for the par-
ties' attendance at the reconsideration. Care should be taken not to prejudice the rights
of other parties. For example, the PSRO should be sure to inform the parties of any
additional data developed during the consultation which would be taken into account at
reconsideration.
147. 397 U.S. at 269.
148. HEW guidelines point out that the costs of such assistance may be met by Med-
icaid. P.S.R.O. Manual ch. XIX, § 1910.3, at 7. No provision is made for Medicare
patients who may also be unable to pay for such assistance.
149. Court cases indicate that there is a right to counsel at the party's option. See
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ful as a patient representative. 150
The need to provide an effective chance to be heard may require that
PSROs aid patients in finding an effective means of representation, particu-
larly when the attending physician will not be taking an active role in sup-
port of the patient's claim. One alternative might be to assign a reviewing
physician having no prior connection with the particular determination to act
as an advocate and advisor to the patient, and to bring out all that can be
said in support of the claim. Interns or residents are possible candidates for
this role.
IV. CONCLUSION
The PSRO program is ambitiously conceived. Pilot efforts applied rela-
tively simple standards, were educational in emphasis, made few formal de-
terminations, and experienced few appeals. PSROs are to operate more for-
mally. More formal determinations mean more reconsiderations: as more
complicated standards are applied by PSROs-standards developed locally
and difficult to verify--even more requests for reconsideration can be ex-
pected.
Courts do not consider that the difficulty or expense of providing fair pro-
cedures permit the cutting of corners at the individual's expense.' 51 The pur-
pose of due process is to protect citizens from intemperate applications of
government efficiency. Moreover, due process is not an abstract notion. It
is the distillate of that which our legal system has learned about finding the
truth. Its application to PSRO determinations should be welcomed as a
means to reach this goal.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970). Cf. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp.,
313 F. Supp. 301, 311 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ("It is often very difficult to decide when
a hearing requires the assistance of counsel.").
150. See S. Lw, supra note 40, at 144; Annas & Healey, The Patient Rights Advo-
cate: Redefining the Doctor-Patient Relationship in the Hospital Context, 27 VAND. L.
REv. 243 (1974). While lay advocates may have a role in helping the patients with
questions concerning eligibility, intake, and the proposed treatment, the usefulness of a
lay advocate in dealing with issues of the medical necessity of treatment seems ques-
tionable.
151. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), in which the Court said:
A prior hearing always imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and
it is often more efficient to dispense with the opportunity for such a hearing.
But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh the constitutional right. ...
Procedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate
all possible interests: it is intended to protect the particular interests of the
person whose possessions are about to be taken.
Id. at 90 n.22 (citations omitted).
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